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2Abstract
During the 1980s, scientiﬁc studies began to uncover a link between the B-vitamin folic acid and a
reduction in the prevalence of neural tube defects, including spina biﬁda and anencephaly. When Congress
passed the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, it included a command that the FDA consider
the link between folic acid and neural tube defects to determine whether the evidence was strong enough
to permit food manufacturers of products containing folic acid to make a claim that their products may
help prevent neural tube defects. Although the FDA initially rejected the use of such a claim, faced with
mounting pressure from the scientiﬁc community and other government agencies, it reversed course and
allowed manufacturers to make certain health claims regarding folic acid. It also required that certain
products be fortiﬁed with folic acid, while banning its addition to other products. This paper details this
process in an attempt to show its complexity and the very serious issues it presents. Since the process is
largely complete, the paper also attempts to evaluate the process, as a whole, to determine what the FDA
did well and what, if anything, the FDA should have done diﬀerently.
3Introduction
In the past, many Americans probably thought little about the ingredients in many of the foods they
consumed. Certainly, in these more health conscious times, consumers are more attentive than ever to
the foods they eat and to the nutritional value of those foods. But, that attention to the foods and their
nutritional values probably consists more of noting the calories, fat, and cholesterol contents than some of
the more mysterious nutrients like Thiamin, Riboﬂavin, Niacin, and Folic Acid. Many consumers probably
have no idea what those nutrients are or why or how they came to be included in many of the foods
purchased today. Interestingly, these nutrients are among those that are often present in foods not because
they naturally occur in them or because they are necessary to make the speciﬁc food item, but because
their inclusion is required by the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). The FDA requires
manufacturers of some food products to include in those products several speciﬁc ingredients if they want
to label their product in a certain way. For example, if the Borden Foods Corporation wants its Prince
brand pastas to say “enriched macaroni product” on the label, the manufacturer must add certain nutrients
in speciﬁc quantities. Similarly, if General Mills Cereals, LLC, wants its Cheerios to say “As Part of A
Heart-Healthy Diet, the Soluble Fiber in Cheerios Can Reduce Your Cholesterol!” it must meet certain
other FDA requirements.
This paper will explore how one speciﬁc nutrient, folic acid, created a controversy for the FDA and is, today,
a required ingredient for certain foods. Folic acid, which is a B vitamin, received little attention until the
mid 1980s, when studies began to uncover evidence of a link between folic acid and the prevention of certain
birth defects, called neural tube defects. As the evidence grew, Congress ordered the FDA to examine the
link and possibly create a rule which would allow manufacturers of food products containing folic acid to
place on the products’ labels a claim stating that consumption of the product may reduce the risk of having
4a child with neural tube defects. The FDA, after numerous delays and several changes in course, ended up
adopting a three-part plan which not only allowed manufacturers to include on their products a health claim
regarding folic acid, but also required certain products to contain folic acid, while banning the addition of
folic acid to others. This paper details that process. It begins with an overview of folic acid and neural tube
defects, then discusses the various scientiﬁc studies which led Congress to take note of folic acid. Only those
studies which were published prior to the FDA taking action are included, as those make up the body of
evidence with which the FDA had to work when it undertook the various folic acid-related programs. The
paper then details the lengthy rulemaking process the FDA went through before arriving at the current rules.
Discussions of recent litigation resulting from the rules, as well as the eﬀects of the rules on the prevalence of
neural tube defects, follow to conclude the paper. The goal of this paper is not to be entirely comprehensive,
but rather to illuminate the various steps and processes which occurred to lead to the present day rules and
requirements regarding folic acid.
Description of Folate1
Folate is the more common term for vitamin B9. The vitamin is found naturally in a variety of foods,
including green vegetables (such as spinach, broccoli, and Brussels sprouts), fruits (such as oranges and
grapefruits), dried beans, and liver, among other things. While folate is a term generally used to describe
this naturally occurring version of the vitamin, the vitamin’s synthetic version, found in dietary supplements
and fortiﬁed foods, is called folic acid. In humans, folate and folic acid are essential during the cell division
and multiplication process, which is why diets lacking in them could lead to impaired cell function. Folate
and folic acid function the same way once absorbed by the body, but the natural folate found in foods is
typically not absorbed as easily as the synthetic form. Some estimates are that 100% of folic acid in foods
1The contents of this section are factual in nature and can be found, except where speciﬁcally noted, throughout the body
of nutritional literature.
5is absorbed by the body, while only 50% of natural folate is so absorbed.2 Both are water soluble, so excess
is excreted from the body, requiring that adequate folate be ingested each day. Excessive folic acid intake
thus results in few side eﬀects although, as will be discussed later, it has been shown to potentially mask
symptoms of a vitamin B12 deﬁciency. In addition to neural tube defects, which are the issue here, folic acid
has been linked to the prevention of several other diseases, including cardiovascular disease and Alzheimer’s
Disease.3 It has also been shown to help lower levels of homocysteine in the blood, which helps reduce the
risk of heart attacks and strokes. Most of the research and the resulting rules and regulations issued by the
FDA refer to the synthetic form, so for the most part the term folic acid, rather than folate, will be used.
Description of Common Neural Tube Defects
A neural tube defect is a malformation of the brain or spinal cord that occurs during fetal development.4
During normal fetal development, the covering for the brain and spinal cord forms approximately 18 to 20
days after conception and closes between 24 and 27 days after conception.5 Therefore, because this initial
development and closure of the neural tube occurs within the ﬁrst month after conception, and because 50%
of all pregnancies in the United States are unplanned, the proper closure of the neural tube often occurs
before a woman realizes she is pregnant.6 It is during this development and closure of the neural tube that
neural tube defects occur, most of which occur when the neural tube fails to close.7
2MayoClinic.com, Folate vs. Folic Acid: What’s the diﬀerence? At http://www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfm?id=HQ00703
3Marian Burros, Eating Well; One More Reason to Eat Your Greens, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2001, at F5.
4Ronald J. Lemire, Neural Tube Defects, 259 JAMA 558 (1988).
5Food Labeling: Health Claims and Label Statements; Folate and Neural Tube Defects, 61 Fed. Reg. 8752, 8753 (March 5,
1996).
6Id.
7Lorenzo D. Botto, et al., Neural Tube Defects, 341 New Eng. J. Med. 1509 (1999).
6The most common types of neural tube defects, accounting for 90% of these defects in the United States, are
anencephaly and spina biﬁda.8 In anencephaly, the defect is in the brain, with brain tissue being “exposed
to the surface through a defect in the scalp and skull.”9 Children born with anencephaly do not have a
forebrain or a cerebrum, and any portion of the brain that does develop is often not covered with bone
or skin.10 This results in an infant who is blind, deaf, unconscious, and unable to feel pain.11 Although
reﬂex action such as breathing and responses to touch and sound may occur, the infant’s lack of a cerebrum
precludes any possibility that it will gain consciousness.12 Therefore, children born with anencephaly are
either stillborn or die soon after birth.13 Approximately 18.38 babies per 100,000 live births were aﬀected by
anencephaly in 1991, and 10.33 per 100,000 live births had this condition in 200014. An unknown number of
cases of anencephaly occur in fetuses which are spontaneously aborted, and an unknown number are detected
through fetal testing and are voluntarily aborted.
While anencephaly occurs when the neural tube fails to close at the head end, spina biﬁda is a defect which
occurs lower along the spinal column. Two forms of spina biﬁda are typically included in neural tube defect
studies and statistics, namely meningocele and myelomenigocele.15 Meningocele is sometimes referred to
as a postneurulation defect, or a closed neural tube defect, because it occurs after the neural tube closes
and is covered by skin.16 This type of spina biﬁda “is a saccular herniation of meninges and cerebrospinal
ﬂuid through a bony defect of the spine.”17 In contrast, myelomenigocele is an open neural tube defect, or
neurulation defect, because it occurs before the neural tube has closed and is, therefore, usually uncovered.18
8Food Labeling, supra note 4, at 8753.
9Lemire, supra note 3, at 558.
10The National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke Information Page, at
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/health and medical/disorders/anencephaly doc.htm.
11Id.
12Id.
13Botto, supra note 6, at 1511.
14Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”), Spina Biﬁda and Anencephaly Prevalence – United States, 1991-2001, 51 Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report (“MMWR”) 9 (Sept. 13, 2002).
15Botto, supra note 6, at 1511.
16Lemire, supra note 3, at 559.
17Botto, supra note 6, at 1511.
18Lemire, supra note 3, at 558.
7In this, the more common type of spina biﬁda, the spinal cord, nerves, or both may protrude through a
defect in the spine.19 These two types of spina biﬁda occurred in 24.88 out of every 100,000 live births in the
United States during 1991, and in 20.85 out of 100,000 in 200020. As with anencephaly, an unknown number
of spina biﬁda cases occur in fetuses which are not carried to term. Unlike anencephaly, which is always
fatal at or immediately after birth, infants born with spina biﬁda can often survive the birthing process and
live for quite some time. Although fatality rates are higher elsewhere, in the United States, 90% of infants
with spina biﬁda survive, with over half living into their 20s.21
Causes of Neural Tube Defects
Although neural tube defects are horrifying and/or deadly, little is known about their cause and, until
recently, little was known about their prevention. Although a few studies in the 1960s and 1970s began to
take note of possible common trends in neural tube defect cases, it was not until the 1980s that researchers
began to make serious progress. Most of the work during the 1980s occurred in the United Kingdom, before
spreading around the world. By the 1990s, research results were being published in the United States,
Hungary, China, and elsewhere. Although many of the studies were subject to possibly bias criticisms and
other ﬂaws, the vast majority pointed to one major factor in the prevention of high numbers of neural
tube defects: folic acid. However, the link between folic acid and neural tube defects is still somewhat of
a mystery today. In fact, it took years for many in the scientiﬁc community to be convinced that such
a link even existed. For example, in one article discussing neural tube defects, published in the Journal
of the American Medical Association in 1988, the author notes that nutrition seems to be a factor in the
incidence of neural tube defects, but lists protein, vitamins, and folic acid all as possible candidates, while
not completely ruling out theories that nitrite-cured meats, blighted potatoes, salicylates, hard water, and
19Botto, supra note 6, at 1511.
20CDC, supra note 13.
21Botto, supra note 6, at 1511.
8certain medications might also be the cause.22 Even the FDA was unwilling to oﬃcially associate folic acid
with the prevention of neural tube defects until 1993. Until that point, the FDA refused to authorize the
use health claims regarding a link between folic acid and neural tube defects, and refused to include folic
acid in the requirements for standardized food types.23 What follows is a survey of the diﬀerent types of
studies conducted and published prior to the FDA’s proposal of folic acid measures in late 1993. Although
new studies analyzing the links between folic acid and neural tube defects are still being published today,
this paper examines only the major studies published prior to 1993, as those were the studies upon which
the FDA based its decision to propose the various folic acid measures it eventually adopted.
Although a potential link between folic acid and neural tube defects was ﬁrst discussed in 1965,24 modern
conclusions regarding the link seem to stem more from research reported in The Lancet in 1980.25 This
study (“Smithells 1980”) focused on the use of several vitamins, not just folic acid, in prevention of neural
tube defects. This is not unexpected, as early research in the area of neural tube defects noted links between
increased likelihood of the defects in lower socioeconomic levels, which led to speculation that a more general
nutrition element may be at issue.26 Therefore, the Smithells 1980 study worked from a hypothesis that
“subclinical deﬁciencies of one or more vitamins contribute to the causation of [neural tube defects].”27
The Smithells 1980 study was conducted using as subjects women living in Northern Ireland, South-East
England, Yorkshire, Lancashire, and Cheshire who previously had at least one pregnancy aﬀected by a neural
tube defect. The women who participated were planning another pregnancy, but were not yet pregnant. This
group consisted of 185 women who were given a vitamin (Pregnavite forte F) daily, beginning at least 28
days before conception and continuing until after the second missed menstrual period, at which point closure
22Lemire, supra note 3 at 559.
23Food Labeling: Health claims and Label Statements; Folic Acid and Neural Tube Defects, 56 Fed. Reg. 60610 (Nov. 27,
1991).
24E.D. Hibbard & R.W. Smithells, Folic acid metabolism and human embryopathy, 1965 The Lancet 1254.
25R.W. Smithells, et al., Possible prevention of neural-tube defects by periconceptional vitamin supplementation, 1980 The
Lancet 339.
26See, e.g., Lemire, supra note 3, at 559, and Smithells, supra note 24, at 339.
27Smithells, supra note 24, at 339.
9of the neural tube should have occurred. The Pregnavite forte F supplements administered provided the
women with vitamin A, vitamin D, thiamine, riboﬂavin, pyridoxine, nicotinamide, ascorbic acid, ferrous
sulphate, and calcium phosphate, at various dosages. The supplements also included 0.36 mg of folic acid.28
Women who missed more than one day of taking the supplement or who became pregnant before taking the
supplement for 28 days were not included in the study. The study used as a control group 264 women who
previously had a pregnancy aﬀected by a neural tube defect but who either declined to participate in the
study or who were pregnant prior to beginning the supplement program.
The 185 study group mothers gave birth to 188 babies (as a result of three sets of twins), which broke down
along the following categories: 140 babies were born without a neural tube defect, 1 baby was born with a
neural tube defect, 11 fetuses were spontaneously aborted (none had a neural tube defect), 26 pregnancies
were still ongoing (but with normal amniotic-ﬂuid α-fetoprotein values, indicating no neural tube defect),
and 10 were not examined. This yields a neural tube defect recurrence rate of 0.6% (1 in 178). The 264
control mothers produced 269 babies (including ﬁve sets of twins), of which 12 had a neural tube defect, 192
had no neural tube defect, 1 was spontaneously aborted and was aﬀected by a neural tube defect, 17 were
spontaneously aborted but had no neural tube defect, 38 remained unborn but had normal amniotic-ﬂuid
α-fetoprotein values, and 9 were not examined. This yields a neural tube defect recurrence rate of 5.0% (13
in 260). Therefore, the results of this early study showed a potential link between vitamin use and neural
tube defects rates, with mothers taking vitamins having approximately 1/8 the rate of neural tube defect
recurrence as mothers not taking the vitamins. Nearly two years later, the same researchers published the
results of a second study conducted the same way as the ﬁrst, yielding similar results.29 In this second study
(“Smithells 1981”), there were two cases of neural tube defects among the 202 mothers receiving supplements
(.99%) and ten cases among the 198 mothers not receiving supplements (5.05%).
28The amount of folic acid is provided here for comparison with amounts used in later studies.
29R.W. Smithells, et al., Vitamin Supplementation and Neural Tube Defects, 1981 The Lancet 1425.
10Perhaps because of such a stark diﬀerence between the two groups’ rates of neural tube defect recurrence, the
Smithells 1980 study received much commentary. The authors, themselves, noted several possible problems
with a conclusion that the vitamins were responsible for the reduced rate, including a potential for women
with a low probability of recurrence somehow self-selecting into the supplementation group and a potential
that something other than the vitamins was causing the lowered rate.30 Although they do not fully explore
it, the authors’ self-selection argument does present an interesting potential problem with the study. The
problem arises because the participants in this study, unlike later trials examined below, were not randomized.
Women were able to choose whether or not they wanted to take the vitamin. There is, therefore, a potential
that the women electing to take the vitamin may have led healthier lifestyles overall, by perhaps eating
better diets, not drinking, not smoking, getting adequate rest and/or exercise, etc. Therefore, the study may
potentially be skewed by more health conscious women electing to take the vitamin.
In addition to criticism, the study also received praise from some commentators. For example, J. H. Edwards
called the results “compelling evidence of a major eﬀect comparable with that relating cigarette smoking
and lung cancer.”31 He noted that the results make it “clear that all women who have an aﬀected child
should receive supplementation for further pregnancies.”32 While Edwards was unwilling to make any
recommendations regarding women who have not had neural tube defect-aﬀected pregnancies, he did think
the study’s results were strong enough to consider fortiﬁcation of the food supply or provision of vitamin
supplements with oral contraceptives with instructions for women to begin taking the vitamins if they stop
taking the contraceptives.33
30Smithells, supra note 24, at 340.
31J. H. Edwards, Vitamin Supplementation and Neural Tube Defects, 1982 The Lancet 275.
32Id.
33Id.
11However, not all commenting researchers were convinced with the Smithells studies. For example, Renwick
noted that the results do not mean that neural tube defects are caused by vitamin deﬁciencies, noting that
the vitamin supplements may correct a problem caused by something else, such as toxicity from blighted
potatoes.34 Chalmers and Sacks also criticized the Smithells studies because 27% of the originally sup-
plemented women were eventually excluded for a variety of technical reasons, even though 300 of the 301
original control women were allowed to proceed. Perhaps more importantly, however, it is their opinion
that the “studies are far too undersized and too short-term to rule out potentially serious and unexpected
side eﬀects of the supplement.”35 Similarly, Meier criticized the studies as being potentially similar to the
study which showed that giving diethylstilboestrol (“DES”) to pregnant women reduced fetal mortality, but
later was shown to cause vaginal cancer in the daughters of women who took DES during pregnancy. Meier,
therefore, believes the potential costs of the results of these studies may be much greater than anticipated.36
Following the published results and criticisms of the Smithells studies, a number other researchers conducted
studies through the 1980s, leading to several more publications during the years immediately surrounding
1990. In 1988, Joseph Mulinare, M.D., along with three other doctors, published the results of a study they
conducted during the mid-1980s (“Atlanta study”).37 The Atlanta study involved the researchers reviewing,
in an after-the-fact way, the records of women who had been part of the Atlanta Birth Defects Case-Control
(“ABDCC”) Study. The researchers then used records of women who had had pregnancies aﬀected by neu-
ral tube defects and who had participated in the ABDCC to form a case group for the Atlanta study. The
Atlanta study used two control groups. One, the normal control group, was made up of randomly chosen
women who had given birth to children without birth defects and who matched certain demographic char-
acteristics (race, time of birth, location of birth, etc.) of speciﬁc case group women. The second control
34J.H. Renwick, Vitamin Supplementation and Neural Tube Defects, 1982 The Lancet 748.
35Thomas C. Chalmers & Henry Sacks, Vitamin Supplements to Prevent Neural Tube Defects, 1982 The Lancet 748.
36Paul Meier, Vitamins to Prevent Neural tube Defects, 1982 The Lancet 859.
37Joseph Mulinare, et al., Periconceptional Use of Multivitamins and the Occurrence of Neural Tube Defects, 260 JAMA
3141 (1988).
12group, the abnormal group, was made up of women who had given birth to babies with serious birth defects
other than neural tube defects, and who matched certain demographic characteristics of speciﬁc case group
women. All three of the groups consisted of women who had been pregnant between 1968 and 1980, and the
case group consisted of 347 women while the control groups consisted of a combined 2829 women.
Using the records, the researchers conducted telephone interviews with the women to determine the level
of vitamin use by each woman prior to and after conception of the speciﬁc baby at issue. The researchers
discovered that 7% of the women in the case group had taken multivitamins during the entire pre- and post-
conception period, while 15% of the control mothers had taken multivitamins during the applicable period.
Forty-six percent of the case mothers and 39% of the control mothers reported no multivitamin use during
the period. Using these results and the incidence of neural tube defects, the Atlanta study yielded a relative
risk of neural tube defects of between 0.41 and 0.51, showing that women who did not use multivitamins
were more likely than women who used multivitamins to have a pregnancy aﬀected by a neural tube defect.
These results are in contrast with a somewhat similar study conducted by James L. Mills, et al. (“Mills
study”), using data from California and Illinois.38 Like the Atlanta study, the Mills study used after-the-
fact questioning, rather than concurrent monitoring and observation. Researchers in the Mills study formed
three groups of women who were pregnant between mid-1985 and mid-1987: case mothers (whose pregnancies
were aﬀected by neural tube defects), abnormal control mothers (whose pregnancies were aﬀected by major
malformations other then neural tube defects) and normal control mothers (whose pregnancies were not
aﬀected by neural tube defects or major malformations). Each group consisted of approximately 550 women
of very similar demographic characteristics, determined through a matching procedure. When a woman with
a neural tube defect-aﬀected pregnancy was discovered (and the researchers examined 82% of the aﬀected
38James L. Mills, et al., The Absence of a Relation Between the Periconceptional use of Vitamins and Neural-Tube Defects,
321 New Eng. J. Med. 430 (1989).
13women in Illinois and 65% of the aﬀected mothers in California), researchers matched a normal and abnormal
control woman of similar characteristics (location, stage of birth, race, date of diagnosis, etc.) to the woman
in the neural tube defect group and included the matched women in the abnormal or normal control group.
Each woman was then interviewed by telephone twice within ﬁve months of delivery or diagnosis: once by
a researcher to conﬁrm the details of the woman’s pregnancy, then a second time by a second researcher
who did not know to which of the three groups the woman belonged. The second interview asked the
women about vitamin use during the month prior to the ﬁrst date of their last menstrual period and the
approximately 45 days later. Women who reported vitamin use were asked to identify the type of vitamin
used. Women were then separated based on how frequently they took the vitamins. Using this data, the
researchers, using the three groups women (which were virtually identical in all characteristics, due to the
matching procedure described above), determined that the use of vitamins across the three groups was not
statistically dissimilar, and that among vitamin users, the odds of having an infant with a neural tube defect
was also not statistically dissimilar. Therefore, the researchers concluded that the use of multivitamins does
not reduce the risk of neural tube defects.
Noting that their study produced results in contrast with that of the Atlanta study and the British studies
discussed above, the authors of the Mills study oﬀered some analysis as to why they considered their results
to be superior. As compared to the British studies, the Mills study authors noted that those studies have
been criticized in numerous ways (as discussed above). Also, the British studies looked only at recurring
cases of neural tube defects and did so in the United Kingdom, which has a much higher rate of neural
tube defects than the United States. The Mills study authors also criticized the Atlanta study, noting that
diﬀerences in results could have been the product of the diﬀering time periods of the two studies (1968-1980
14for the Atlanta study versus 1985-1987 for the Mills study) and the diﬀering locations for the two studies
(Atlanta, Georgia, versus Illinois and California). However, the authors of the Mills study also noted several
diﬀerences between the studies which might, in fact, make the Mills study superior to the Atlanta study.
First, the authors noted that in the Atlanta study, women were interviewed from two to 16 years after the
pregnancy at issue, leading to a larger potential for recall bias than in the Mills study, where the interviews
occurred no more than 5 months after the pregnancy. Also, this time diﬀerence made it more diﬃcult for the
Atlanta researchers to determine what type of multivitamin the women took, leading the Mills researchers
to believe their results to be more accurate.
Approximately three months after the Mills study was reported in The New England Journal of Medicine,
the results of another multivitamin-neural tube defect study were published in the Journal of the American
Medical Association. This study (“Milunsky study”) found a link between multivitamins, and speciﬁcally
folic acid, and neural tube defects.39 The Milunsky study examined women when they had a maternal serum
α-fetoprotein (MSAFP) screen or an amniocentesis. These generally occurred during the ﬁrst 15 to 20 weeks
of the pregnancy. Of the participants, 86% of the women were from New England, with the remaining 14%
from areas of the United States outside New England. Nurses contacted the women via telephone after the
tests were conducted and prior to (in 93% of the cases) the women or the nurses receiving the results of the
tests. The nurses questioned the women on “family, medical, and genetic history with special emphasis on
diet, medication, and illness during the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy.”40 The questions allowed the researchers
to determine multivitamin use during the three months prior to pregnancy as well as during the ﬁrst three
months of the pregnancy, and also provided detailed information about the women’s diet during that time
period, allowing the researchers to determine the amount of folic acid consumed as part of the diet during
those same periods. Of the 24,559 women contacted, the nurses obtained complete interviews from 22,776.
39Aubrey Milunsky, et al., Multivitamin/Folic Acid Supplementation in Early Pregnancy Reduces the Prevalence of Neural
Tube Defect, 262 JAMA 2847 (1989).
40Id. at 2848.
15The researchers broke the data down in numerous ways, allowing them to determine the eﬀects of folic acid
and multivitamin intake for a variety of periods. Several pieces of data are of particular interest here. First,
the study found 1.2 cases of neutral tube defects per 1000 pregnancies among women who used multivitamins
at least once per week during the three months before and after pregnancy. This compares to a prevalence
of 3.5 per 1000 in the women who used no multivitamins and 2.4 per 1000 in women who took multivitamins
during the ﬁrst trimester only. This yields a prevalence ratio of 0.36 for the women using multivitamins
before and after conception compared to no multivitamins and 0.68 for women using multivitamins during
the ﬁrst trimester only compared with the women using no multivitamins. This implies a beneﬁt to using
multivitamins during the ﬁrst trimester, and a greater beneﬁt to using multivitamins before pregnancy and
during the ﬁrst trimester. Examining the data in a diﬀerent way, women who used multivitamins during
the ﬁrst six weeks of pregnancy (prior to the closure of the neural tube) had 1.1 cases of neural tube defect
per 1000 pregnancies, compared to 3.5 cases in women not using multivitamins and 3.2 cases in women
using multivitamins after the seventh week of pregnancy, only. This implies that most of the beneﬁts of
multivitamin use result when use is during the ﬁrst six weeks of pregnancy.
The Milunsky study also found that use of a multivitamin (during the ﬁrst six weeks of pregnancy) containing
folic acid yielded 0.9 cases of neural tube defect per 1000 pregnancies, where use of a multivitamin without
folic acid resulted in 3.2 cases per 1000 and no multivitamin was 3.5 cases per 1000. This seems to imply
that folic acid, rather than simply a multivitamin, is necessary for the beneﬁts to occur. By examining
the diets of women not using multivitamins, the researchers determined that in women whose diet during
the ﬁrst six weeks of pregnancy contained more than 100 micrograms of folic acid per day had 3.1 cases of
neural tube defect per 100 pregnancies, compared to 7.3 per 1000 in women whose diets had less than 100
micrograms of folic acid per day. This implies that more than 100 micrograms of folic acid in the diet during
early pregnancy can also yield a protective beneﬁt.
16The results of the Milunsky study seem to point toward a substantial beneﬁt of folic acid intake prior to the
sixth week of pregnancy. These results are perhaps more valuable than others discussed previously because of
the sheer scope of this study, as it included over 22,000 pregnancies. The authors note that their results are
similar to those of Smithells, examined above. They also note, though, an obvious limitation of their study,
in that its sample is not representative of the general population. For example, of the 22,776 women in the
study, 96% were white and 70% of the women had attended college. However, as the authors note, while the
results of the study may not be transferable to the public at large, they “have no reason to hypothesize that
the higher risk for NTD among [their] subjects should make their response to folic acid biologically diﬀerent
from that of other women.”41 Therefore, the authors predict that use of a multivitamin containing folic acid
during the ﬁrst six weeks of pregnancy could prevent 50% of the occurrences of neural tube defects.42
It is interesting to note that, as mentioned above, the Milunsky study was published three months after
the Mills study, and yields completely contradictory results. The authors of the Milunsky study received
the results of the Mills study as they published their own, and attached as an addendum their assessment
of the contradiction between the two studies. The Milunsky authors note that in their study, the use of
multivitamins was ascertained early in the pregnancies, and usually prior to the participants’ or researchers’
knowledge of whether the pregnancy was aﬀected by a neural tube defect. This contrasts with the Mills
study, where multivitamin use was determined after the birth of the baby or after a neural tube defect was
identiﬁed. This delayed questioning leads, according to the Milunsky authors, to “substantial recall error
that tends to lead to a null result.”43 Additionally, the Milunsky authors note that the Mills study classiﬁed
as nonusers of multivitamins those women who began taking the multivitamins after they discovered they
41Id. at 2851.
42Id. at 2852.
43Id.
17were pregnant. In the Milunsky study, 22% of women reported taking vitamins beginning during the ﬁrst 6
weeks of pregnancy. This led the Milunsky authors to note that if such use does provide a protective eﬀect,
this would have been included in the nonusers, not the users, in the Mills study, also leading to an inaccurate
result in the Mills study.
It is useful to pause here to note that the above-discussed studies provide a fairly comprehensive overview of
the research available in 1990. This is noteworthy because 1990 is the year in which the FDA ﬁrst became
involved in the folic acid-neural tube defect issue in the United States. Although it will be discussed in
greater detail below, Congress in 1990 passed the Nutritional Education and Labeling Act. As part of the
legislation, Congress directed the FDA to consider whether there was enough evidence of certain nutrient-
disease relationships, of which folic acid-neural tube defects was one, to allow manufacturers of foods to
label their foods with health claims regarding the relationships. Therefore, in the years following 1990 when
the FDA ﬁrst began to review the issue in terms of health claims manufacturers might place on products
containing folic acid, whether folic acid should be required as part of the food fortiﬁcation program, and
what restrictions, if any, needed to be placed on folic acid fortiﬁcation, the previously described studies form
the basis of the research available to it. Because these studies are in some ways ﬂawed, non-comprehensive,
and contradictory, the FDA’s actions become more understandable. The studies described in the pages that
follow are those the results of which were released as the FDA began to tackle the issue, and they provide
more evidence on which the FDA could begin to base its actions.
Post 1990 studies
Although many of the earlier, above-detailed, studies were not actively-conducted, randomized studies yield-
ing concrete results, and some were small in scope, one major randomized study was published in mid-1991.44
44MRC Vitamin Study Research Group, Prevention of neural tube defects: Results of the Medical Research Council Vitamin
Study, 338 The Lancet 131 (1991).
18This randomized control trial study was conducted in the United Kingdom, and was praised by the U.S. Pub-
lic Health Service as “one of the most rigorously conducted studies.”45 The study (“MRC study”) ran from
1983 through 1991, and included over 1000 women from the United Kingdom, Hungary, Israel, Australia,
Canada, the USSR, and France. All of the women already had a neural tube defect-aﬀected pregnancy, were
planning on becoming pregnant again, and were not taking vitamins. The women were randomly assigned
to one of four groups and given capsules which contained: (a) 4 mg of folic acid only, (b) a multivitamin
containing 4 mg of folic acid, (c) nothing or, (d) a multivitamin not containing folic acid. The women took
one capsule each day through the 12th week of pregnancy, and it appears that women who became pregnant
within two weeks of beginning the study were categorized separately.
By the time the study ended, 1195 women of the 1817 women randomized had a pregnancy which was
examined for neural tube defects. In the 483 women in the MRC study who received folic acid, the recurrence
rate of neural tube defects was 0.6%, compared with a recurrence rate of 3.6% in the 477 women who did
not receive folic acid. Additionally, results were received from approximately the same number of women
in each of the four groups (234-243 women), and the actual number of cases of neural tube defects was one
in the group receiving only folic acid, 2 in the group receiving the folic acid and the multivitamin, 10 in
the group receiving nothing, and 7 in the group receiving the multivitamin without folic acid. Taken as
a whole, the results seem to indicate that 72% of neural tube defects were prevented in the groups taking
folic acid. Although the study’s participants were all women who were at an increased risk for neural tube
defects pregnancies because they already had at least one aﬀected pregnancy, the authors predict that the
preventative eﬀect of folic acid would apply similarly to women who had not previously had a neural tube
defect pregnancy. They therefore suggested that all women should increase their folic acid intake.
45CDC, Recommendations for the Use of Folic Acid to Reduce the number of Cases of Spina Biﬁda and Other Neural Tube
Defects, 41 MMWR 1 (Sept. 11, 1992).
19Approximately one year later, another major study was published in The New England Journal of Medicine
(“Hungarian study”).46 When the results of this study were announced (prior to publication) in the spring of
1992, they were perhaps the ﬁnal piece of evidence necessary for many researchers to accept the link between
folic acid and neural tube defects, according to Dr. James Mills, chief of pediatric epidemiology at the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, and author of the previously described Mills
Study.47 This study, conducted by doctors in Hungary, was similar to the MRC study, except the subjects
were women who had not previously had a neural tube defect-aﬀected pregnancy. This is important, as 95%
of pregnancies aﬀected by neural tube defects occur in women who have not previously had a pregnancy
aﬀected by a neural tube defect.48 In the Hungarian study, women who were planning to become pregnant
were randomly assigned to either take a multivitamin (containing, among other things, 0.8 mg of folic acid)
or a trace-element supplement. The women were to take the supplement daily for three months before
attempting to conceive a child, then to continue daily intake of the supplement for the ﬁrst three months of
pregnancy. To be counted in the multivitamin group, the women had to take the vitamin daily for at least
28 days before conception and continue intake of the supplement until at least the date of the second missed
menstrual period. Of the 7540 women entering the study, 4753 became pregnant and 4704 were studied.
The study noted rates of both congenital malformations and neural tube defects, with both being less
prevalent in the multivitamin group. The rate of congenital malformations was 22.9 per 1000 in the trace-
element group and 13.3 per 1000 in the multivitamin group. There were no cases of neural tube defects in
the multivitamin group (consisting of 2394 women) and 6 cases in the trace-element group (of 2310 women).
46Andrew E. Czeizel & Istv´ an Dud´ as, Prevention of the First Occurrence of Neural-Tube Defects by Periconceptional Vitamin
Supplementation, 327 New Eng. J. Med. 1832 (1992).
47Gina Kolata, U.S. Backs a Vitamin to Foil Birth Defects, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1992, at C2.
48Id.
20The number of neural tube defects in the trace-element group was consistent with the 5.7 cases expected,
based on Hungarian records. Therefore, the authors note that the protective eﬀect of multivitamins and
folic acid noted in the above-described studies of women with previous neural tube defect pregnancies is also
available to prevent ﬁrst-time occurrences of neural tube defects. The Hungarian authors thus recommend,
as did the authors of previous studies, that women planning to become pregnant should consume a vitamin
supplement containing folic acid.
FDA scrambles to deal with Folic Acid
By the early 1990s, the publication of the above described studies made it fairly clear to the scientiﬁc
community that there was a link between folic acid and the prevention of a high percentage of neural tube
defects. However, to receive the protective eﬀects of folic acid, it appears that a woman must be ingesting it
prior to conception and during at least the ﬁrst month of pregnancy. After this time, the neural tube should
have formed and any defect would already be present and irreversible. This posed a potential problem,
though, because often women do not realize they are pregnant until several weeks after conception. Also,
in the United States 50% of pregnancies are unplanned.49 Women not planning to become pregnant might
have a further delay in discovering their pregnancy. This is complicated by the fact that very few women
even knew of the helpful beneﬁts of folic acid. For example, even by 1995, after the beneﬁts of folic acid
had been publicized in major media outlets, a March of Dimes survey determined that only 52% of women
had ever heard of folic acid, only 9% of those women knew that folic acid helped prevent birth defects, and
only 1% of all women listed folic acid intake as one way a woman could reduce the risk of birth defects.50
Health oﬃcials were thus faced with the dilemma of how to ensure that women would receive adequate folic
acid prior to becoming pregnant and during early pregnancy. A likely candidate to solve this problem was
49Food Labeling, supra note 4.
50Id. at 8772.
21the FDA, and during the early 1990s it was prompted from two fronts to take action on this issue. First,
Congress in 1990 passed the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990. Second, the Public Health
Service in 1992 made a recommendation that all women receive folic acid as part of their diet and suggested
that the FDA undertake a plan to assist in this.
On November 8, 1990, the ﬁrst President Bush signed the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990
(“NLEA”).51 The NLEA amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDC Act”), the main act
which governs the FDA, in several ways. The ﬁrst way the NLEA amended the FDC Act (through the
addition of a new subsection (q) for section 403 of the FDC Act52) was by adding a provision classifying
any food as misbranded unless it carries a nutrition label which speciﬁes certain informational items, such
as serving size, servings per container, number of calories per serving, and the amount of certain nutrients,
vitamins, and minerals per serving. The NLEA requires that the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(and by delegation, the FDA) issue proposed regulations implementing this section within 12 months and
issue ﬁnal regulations within 24 months.
The second main way the NLEA amended the FDC Act, and the way which is at issue here, was in the area
of claims made by manufacturers on the label of food products. While the ﬁrst amendment classiﬁed a food
as misbranded if it failed to contain certain nutritional information, this new section (a new subsection (r)
for section 403 of the FDC Act) classiﬁes a food as misbranded if its label carries either of two claims. First,
it is misbranded if its label carries a claim that “characterizes the level of any nutrient which is of the type
required by” the new section (q) to be placed on the nutrition label. Second, it is misbranded if its label
“characterizes the relationship of any nutrient which is of the type required by [the new (q) section] to be in
the label or labeling of the food to a disease or a health-related condition.” Both types of claims are thus
banned from food packaging unless they meet the requirements of the new subsection (r). The ﬁrst type
51Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535 (1990). For the discussion which follows, all references
are to the NLEA Act unless otherwise noted.
5242 U.S.C. § 343.
22of claim (the “level of nutrient” claims) may be placed on food packaging if they comply with regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (and, thus, the FDA). These types of claims
are now governed by the FDA regulations deﬁning such terms as “good source” or “high” or “rich in.”53
The “level of nutrient” claims are also restricted regarding when they may state the absence of a nutrient,
the level of cholesterol, the level of saturated fat, and the level of dietary ﬁber. Also, the “level of nutrient”
claims are restricted if food contains a nutrient which the FDA, through enacted regulations, has determined
may cause negative health eﬀects for some people.
The second type of restricted claims (the “health eﬀects” claims) face separate restrictions from the “level
of nutrient” claims. The NLEA bars all “health eﬀects” claims (such as “This product is a good source
of folate – a vitamin necessary for the prevention of neural tube defects”) unless the FDA has issued a
regulation speciﬁcally allowing for such claims and the product at issue does not contain a nutrient which
the FDA, through regulation, has determined may be harmful to humans in certain speciﬁed circumstances.
The NLEA allows the FDA to make such regulations on if it “determines, based on the totality of publicly
available scientiﬁc evidence (including evidence from well-designed studies conducted in a manner which is
consistent with generally recognized scientiﬁc procedures and principles), that there is signiﬁcant scientiﬁc
agreement, among experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience to evaluate such claims, that the
claim is supported by such evidence.”54 The NLEA then required the FDA to promulgate regulations which
carry out the provisions of the new amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Among other
regulations required to be promulgated within 12 months, the NLEA required that the FDA examine the
relationships between the following nutrients and diseases to determine whether claims regarding them may
be made pursuant to the various subparts of the new (r) subsection: Calcium and osteoporosis, dietary ﬁber
and cancer, lipids and cardiovascular disease, lipids and cancer, sodium and hypertension, dietary ﬁber and
53See 21 C.F.R. § 101.54 (2002).
5442 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i).
23cardiovascular disease, folic acid and neural tube defects, antioxidant vitamins and cancer, zinc and immune
function in the elderly, and omega-3 fatty acids and heart disease.
Thus, buried deep in the NLEA, laid the ﬁrst impetus for the FDA to begin a course of action on the folic
acid-neural tube defect relationship. Because of the NLEA, manufacturers of products containing suﬃcient
quantities of folic acid could not claim consumption of their product would be helpful in the prevention of
neural tube defects. This would have been one avenue by which women could learn about the importance
of neural tube defects and identify those products containing suﬃcient quantities of the nutrient. The only
way such claims could be placed on food labels was for the FDA to issue a regulation allowing for the claim
to be made. However, pursuant to the NLEA, the FDA could not issue such a regulation unless there was
suﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence and agreement among scientiﬁc experts as to the validity of the claim.
Initial Action under the NLEA
Pursuant to the NLEA, the FDA published in the November 27, 1991, edition of the Federal Register
its proposed regulations regarding the “use of health claims that characterize the relationship of a food
component to a disease or health-related condition on the labels and in the labeling of both conventional
foods and dietary supplements.”55 The issuance of these proposed regulations marked the beginning of the
FDA’s transition to operating under the structure of the NLEA. Prior to the issuance of these proposed
regulations, the FDA had actually begun its own process of authorizing the types of health claims at issue
here. Originally, the FDA did not allow manufacturers to make claims on their food labels concerning the
use of their product in relation to disease prevention. The FDA operated under the assumption that such
claims classiﬁed the food as a drug under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.56 In 1987, however,
the FDA “respond[ed] to the developing scientiﬁc data on the relationship between the nutrient content
55Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 56 Fed. Reg. 60537 (Nov. 27, 1991).
56Id.
24of the diet and disease” by proposing to amend its regulations to allow truthful health claims which were
supported in various speciﬁc ways by the scientiﬁc and medical communities, thus creating a safe harbor
from FDA enforcement action.57
After manufacturers began to stretch the limits of the proposed regulations, prompting FDA enforcement
action, the FDA in 1990 withdrew the 1987 proposal and reproposed the regulations in a more strict form.
In the reproposal, the FDA suspended the safe harbor at least until ﬁnal rules were adopted, which meant
health claims would be examined by the FDA on a case by case basis. However, this line of proposed rules
terminated after the President signed the NLEA, as the FDA then began to work to implement the NLEA’s
own general rules regarding health claims on labels. The NLEA directed the FDA to promulgate regulations
authorizing health claims, and speciﬁcally directed the FDA to consider the appropriateness of 10 nutrient-
disease relationships, of which folic acid-neural tube defects was one. Thus, beginning with the NLEA, if
consumers were to be informed, through product labeling, of the beneﬁcial eﬀects of folic acid in preventing
neural tube defects, the FDA would ﬁrst have to authorize the use of such claims.
In the November 27, 1991, issue of the Federal Register, the FDA ﬁrst proposed its regulations regarding
health claims on food and dietary supplement packaging. The regulations cover such topics as making
proposals to the FDA for new health claims, the issues the FDA will consider in deciding whether to approve
the health claim (including safety and eﬀects on the population), the requirements for validity (including
the necessary level of scientiﬁc and medical community support), and speciﬁc requirements of the claim as
proposed to be printed on food or dietary supplement labels. The regulations also prohibited any health
57Id. at 60538.
25claims unless the claims had been approved by the FDA. Although most health claims would reach the FDA
through a petition for consideration (a procedure outlined in these regulations), Congress placed the folic
acid-neural tube defects relationship in front of the FDA in the NLEA, so no petition was necessary.
Since the NLEA required the FDA to act on 10 nutrient-disease relationships without waiting for petitions
from the industry, the FDA followed its proposed regulations in the November 27, 1991, edition of the
Federal Register with articles relating to each of the 10 relationships. Thus, the initial discussion of the
folic acid-neural tube defects relationship also appears in the November 27, 1991, Federal Register.58 There,
the FDA proposed to decline authorizing the placement of health claims related to folic acid on labels for
foods and dietary supplements. In this denial, the FDA used the standard established in the previously
described Federal Register document in which it stated “such claims would only be justiﬁed for substances
in dietary supplements as well as in conventional foods if the totality of the publicly available scientiﬁc
evidence... supports a claim; and if there is signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement, among experts qualiﬁed by
scientiﬁc training and experience to evaluate such claims about such support.”59 Thus, following that
standard, the FDA found that there was not suﬃcient agreement among scientiﬁc experts as to the eﬀects
and the necessary dosage of folic acid in the prevention of neural tube defects.
In reaching its decision to deny health claims regarding folic acid and neural tube defects, the FDA examined
all of the scientiﬁc studies described in a previous section of this paper, with the exception of the Hungarian
Study, which had not yet been released. It is therefore necessary to examine the FDA’s analysis of the
scientiﬁc evidence to determine why, when faced with the scientiﬁc evidence previously noted, it was unable
to ﬁnd suﬃcient scientiﬁc evidence and support for these health claims. Although the FDA did review other
government and scientiﬁc literature in reaching its decision, it appears to have given very little weight to
those pieces, making it unnecessary to review the FDA’s commentary on those works here.
58Food Labeling: Health Claims and Label Statements; Folic Acid and Neural Tube Defects, 56 Fed. Reg. 60610 (Nov. 27,
1991).
59Id.
26The FDA’s reasons for not accepting the results of the scientiﬁc studies as conclusive enough to allow for
the authorization of health claims appear to break down into four categories: (1) Location of the study
participants, (2) Amount of folic acid used in the study, (3) Eﬀects of other vitamins, (4) Flaws in the
study, itself. First, the FDA discredited the results of many of the studies because of the location of the
participants. The crux of the FDA’s problem with the studies was that they were either studies of non-U.S.
populations or were studies of subsets of populations within the U.S. which have higher than average rates
of neural tube defects. For example, the FDA noted that the results of the Smithells study and the MRC
study were diﬃcult to project onto the general U.S. population because the U.S. is an area of relatively low
risk for neural tube defects compared to the countries examined in those studies. Additionally, those studies,
and others, examined only women who previously had a pregnancy aﬀected by a neural tube defect, making
those women at high risk for an additional aﬀected pregnancy. Thus, the FDA expressed concern about
generalizing the results obtained from these studies of “high-risk populations” to the larger population of
“all women of child-bearing age.”60
The FDA also expressed doubts about the generalizability of the studies, such as the Milunsky study and
the Atlanta study, which took place in the U.S. It found the participants in the Milunsky study to not
be representative of the general population because they were “receiving prenatal care and had a maternal
α-fetoprotein screen or an amniocentesis.”61 The Atlanta study was problematic because the results were
only statistically signiﬁcant for white women, not for women of other races. Regarding both studies, the
FDA noted that examined women who had taken vitamins and women “who take or are willing to take
supplements may have other characteristics that by themselves decrease the risk of having an infant with a
neural tube defect.”62 Thus, the FDA discounted the results of nearly all of the available studies because
60Id. at 60621.
61Id.
62Id.
27for one reason or another, the studies did not have a population which had the necessary characteristics to
make its results transferable to the general U.S. population.
The FDA also expressed concern over the diﬀering amounts of folic acid used in the various studies. In
general, the FDA seemed to regard the MRC study highly, calling it “carefully performed,” and noting its
signiﬁcance.63 However, despite this praise, the FDA was unwilling to ﬁnd the necessary support from the
study because it was conducted using supplements providing 4 mg of folic acid per day. This amount is
higher than can be obtained from a diet high in folate-rich foods, and is higher than the amount legally
allowed to be added to foods through supplementation.64 The FDA classiﬁes products which provide 4 mg
of folic acid as drugs. Thus, the FDA considered the amounts used in the MRC study to be too high to
authorize for consumption in the U.S., and therefore did not provide support for health claims regarding
lower amounts of folic acid.
Although other studies used dosages of less than 4 mg of folic acid, the FDA discounted those studies because
of the potential protective eﬀects of other vitamins. The Smithells study used a lower amount of folic acid
(0.36 mg), but, among other apparent problems, the FDA noted that the folic acid was part of a supplement
which contained other nutrients, so the eﬀect of the folic acid could not be isolated. The FDA found a similar
problem with the Atlanta and Milunsky studies. In the Atlanta study the composition of the multivitamin
could not be determined because women were interviewed between two and 16 years after having taken the
multivitamin. In the Milunsky study the level of folic acid ingested by the participants varied from 0.1 mg
to 1 mg. Additionally, the multivitamins used by the participants in that study also typically contained
63Id. at 60622.
64In 1991, the maximum amount of folic acid allowed to be added to food was governed by §172.345, which allowed folic acid
to be added to food in an amount which would “not result in daily ingestion of the additive in excess of 0.4 mg.”
28vitamins A, C, D, or E, so the FDA questioned whether one or more of the other vitamins alone or together
with folic acid may have provided the protective beneﬁts. Thus, the FDA determined that “there is no
scientiﬁc evidence that periconceptional supplementation of women of childbearing age with doses of folic
acid lower than 4 mg per day will signiﬁcantly reduce the risk of neural tube birth defects.”65
Finally, the FDA was troubled by issues relating to the design of several of the studies. Regarding the
Smithells study, for example, the FDA noted that “[n]o true control group was included,” and that unsup-
plemented women were pregnant before entering the study, while supplemented women were recruited for
the study prior to becoming pregnant.66 The FDA also had problems with the fact that infants of fully-
supplemented mothers were examined to determine whether the vitamins may have harmed the fetus, while
only part of the results were published for this group, and no results were published for the unsupplemented
mothers or partially-supplemented mothers, thus not allowing for comparison. Additionally, the FDA found
bias weaknesses in several of the studies. Regarding the Atlanta study, the FDA noted the fact that par-
ticipants had diﬀering, and sometimes quite long recall periods. Also, it noted that there were diﬀerences
between the case group and the control group in the areas of socioeconomic status and lifestyle character-
istics. With the Mills study, the FDA noted a weakness resulting from the fact that the researchers were
unable to identify and interview all cases. And, with the Milunsky study, the FDA noted issues related to
nonresponsiveness of subjects. Thus, the FDA found the results of these studies to be somewhat problematic
on structural grounds.
Based on the scientiﬁc evidence available as of 1991, the FDA thus concluded that it should not authorize
health claims related to folic acid and the prevention of neural tube defects. The FDA concluded that, based
65Food Labeling, supra note 23, at 60622.
66Id. at 60620.
29on the MRC study, women at high risk for neural tube defects need an amount of folic acid that is higher
than can be obtained through natural sources and is at a level such that an adequate supplement would be
considered a drug. While it found 4 mg may be advisable for high risk women after consultation with a
physician, it found such an amount “inappropriate for a food.”67 Regarding amounts lower than 4 mg, the
FDA determined there was “no scientiﬁc evidence that periconceptional supplementation... will signiﬁcantly
reduce the risk of neural tube defects.”68 Thus, the FDA was unwilling to ﬁnd the requisite agreement of
qualiﬁed scientiﬁc experts to allow manufacturers to use these health claims.
The CDC Recommendation
On September 11, 1992, the FDA’s initial denial of health claims regarding the relationship between folic
acid and neural tube defects was indirectly challenged by a completely contrary recommendation issued by
the Public Health Service (“PHS”) and the Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”).69 That day, the CDC
published in its Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (“MMWR”) a recommendation that “[a]ll women
of childbearing age in the United States who are capable of becoming pregnant should consume 0.4 mg of
folic acid per day for the purpose of reducing their risk of having a pregnancy aﬀected with spina biﬁda or
other [neural tube defects].” Not only does this blanket recommendation of folic acid consumption for all
women do exactly what the FDA was unwilling to do, it is based on the exact same scientiﬁc studies which,
less than one year earlier, the FDA classiﬁed as inconclusive.
The CDC ﬁrst issued recommendations regarding folic acid use in the prevention of neural tube defects
approximately one year earlier, in the August 2, 1991, edition of the MMWR.70 There, the CDC examined
the results of the MRC study and, based on the study’s conclusions, issued a recommendation that women
who previously had a pregnancy aﬀected by a neural tube defect should consume 4.0 mg of folic acid for
67Id. at 60622.
68Id.
69CDC, supra note 43.
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30the period beginning at least one month prior to becoming pregnant through the ﬁrst three months of the
pregnancy. Because this dosage was very high, but was the lowest amount used in a conclusive study,
the CDC made this an interim recommendation, pending the outcome of future studies. The 1992 PHS
recommendation, however, was made based on the same available data.
In its 1992 recommendations, the PHS brieﬂy summarized the evidence, reached a conclusion based on
the evidence, then made cautionary notes. The evidence the PHS used in making its recommendation is
the same set of randomized controlled trials, nonrandomized intervention trials, and observational studies
discussed above and examined by the FDA. The only exception is the PHS notes the preliminary results of
the Hungarian study which, although not formally published until several months later, had been reported in
a 1989 letter to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association.71 In reviewing the scientiﬁc
studies, with an emphasis on the MRC study, the PHS “inferred that folic acid alone at levels of 0.4 mg per
day will reduce the risk of NTDs.” Furthermore, the PHS estimated that use of folic acid at that level would
reduce the occurrence of neural tube defects by 50% in the United States.
The PHS recommendation applied to all women of childbearing age who are capable of becoming pregnant
because 50% of American pregnancies are unplanned and the protective eﬀects require ingestion of folic acid
before conception and in the ﬁrst month of pregnancy. Thus, the PHS noted that folic acid needed to be
delivered to the general population at the recommended levels. In order to achieve this, the PHS proposed
three mechanisms: (1) improvement of dietary habits, (2) fortiﬁcation of the food supply, and (3) use of
dietary supplements. For implementation of its recommendation through one of these three avenues, the PHS
turned speciﬁcally to the FDA, stating that the FDA would need to decide which of the suggested methods
would best meet the PHS goal while ensuring that the population did not receive excessive amounts of folic
acid. Thus, the PHS seems to have placed the ball directly in the FDA’s court by making a strong, concrete
71A.E. Czeizel & G. Fritz, Letter to editor, 262 JAMA 1634 (1989).
31recommendation based on the available scientiﬁc data, then speciﬁcally calling on the FDA to implement
that recommendation.
The PHS recommendation was not, however, an unqualiﬁed recommendation. The PHS made clear, as it
ﬁrst mentioned in its 1991 recommendation, that high levels of folic acid may have unknown eﬀects and may
complicate the diagnosis of vitamin B12 deﬁciency. While noting that folic acid is water soluble, and thus
excess is excreted through the urine, the PHS expressed concern that high levels may make it diﬃcult to
discover vitamin B12 deﬁciency in some people, delaying diagnosis and treatment and resulting in irreversible
neurological damage. Therefore, the PHS’s recommendation capped folic acid intake at 1 mg per day, which
is why it noted that the FDA would need to exercise caution so as to provide the population with at least 0.4
mg of folic acid daily, while keeping total ingestion under 1 mg per day. Although it set 1 mg of folic acid as
the safe upper limit, the PHS stated that women who previously had a pregnancy aﬀected by a neural tube
defect could still follow the 1991 recommendation of 4 mg per day, but should consult with their doctors
regarding such a dosage.
FDA responds again
After being placed squarely in the spotlight by the 1992 PHS recommendation, the FDA responded in the
January 6, 1993, Federal Register, where it again denied authorization of health claims touting the beneﬁts
of folic acid in reducing the prevalence of neural tube defects.72 This second denial came over a year after the
original denial was proposed in November, 1991. That initial proposal was followed by a comment period,
which ended on February 25, 1992. Five months later, however, when faced with new scientiﬁc evidence, the
FDA reopened the comment period, thus delaying this ﬁnal action. After the FDA reopened the comment
period, the PHS published its recommendation for daily folate consumption by women of childbearing age,
72Food Labeling: Health Claims and Label Statements; Folic Acid and Neural Tube Defects, 58 Fed. Reg. 2606 (Jan. 6,
1993).
32which clearly stated that the FDA would need to act in order for the recommendation to be fulﬁlled.
The FDA’s ﬁnal denial of health claims in January 1993, therefore, addressed the PHS recommendation.
Speciﬁcally, the FDA noted ﬁve issues raised by PHS which are the responsibility of the FDA under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: “(1) Identifying the population at risk, (2) considerations of ap-
propriate level of intake with respect to options for implementation, (3) magnitude of beneﬁt, (4) safety
considerations, and (5) implementing the recommendation.”73 These ﬁve issues, albeit in slightly altered
form, are the basis for the FDA’s ultimate decision to deny the health claims again. Therefore, these issues
will be examined below in order to understand why, even when faced with the same scientiﬁc evidence with
which the PHS dealt, the FDA was still unwilling to allow folic acid health claims to be included on product
labeling.
The ﬁrst issue the FDA examined was the estimation of the range of likely intakes of folic acid if a claim
was authorized. The FDA anticipated that if such a claim were to be authorized, food manufacturers would
add folic acid to their products in order to make use of the health claim, resulting in a situation where large
portions of the population might consume more than 3 mg per day. Also, the FDA considered it possible
that some groups within the general population, including heavy users of supplements, might consume more
than 7 mg per day. This was a concern because the eﬀects of consuming large quantities of folic acid for
long periods of time were unknown. Thus, the FDA was uncertain of the amounts likely to be consumed if
a health claim were to be authorized.
A second issue the FDA raised was the potential for safety concerns if people were to consume large quantities
73Id.
33of folic acid. The ﬁrst category of health issues relates to vitamin B12. As the FDA noted, pernicious anemia
of vitamin B12 results in readily apparent hematologic disturbances and more hidden neurologic disturbances.
However, certain levels of folic acid can improve the hematologic symptoms while apparently allowing the
neurologic damage to continue. Thus, because the hematologic disturbances are more apparent, and thus
are a symptom used to diagnose vitamin B12 deﬁciency, if they are masked by folic acid the neurologic
damage may continue unchecked. Because the FDA was uncertain as to what levels of folic acid will allow
the masking of symptoms of pernicious anemia while neurologic damage continues, it feared that levels of
folic acid people were likely to ingest if a health claim were to be authorized might be high enough to cause
this problem.
A second potential safety issue was that it was uncertain how pregnant women would respond to large doses
of folic acid. Besides masking pernicious anemia, the FDA noted that high levels of folic acid may inhibit
nutrient absorption or cause damage to the fetus’s neural tube development. A third potential safety issue
was the unknown eﬀects of folic acid on persons taking antifolate drugs to treat such conditions as psoriasis,
rheumatoid arthritis, bronchial asthma, malaria, hypertension, Crohn’s disease, gout, epilepsy, and AIDS.
As part of the treatment of these conditions, patients take drugs which interfere with folate metabolism, and
the FDA was concerned that if such individuals were to ingest high levels of folic acid, the folic acid could
interfere with the eﬀectiveness of their medications or be potentially toxic. A fourth, but somewhat related
health risk is that it is unknown whether high levels of folic acid might interfere with the eﬀectiveness of
anticonvulsant medications taken by epileptics. Thus, these four categories of potential health uncertainties
were more reasons the FDA was unwilling to authorize health claims for folic acid. It is interesting to note,
however, that despite the importance the FDA gives to the uncertainties regarding these health areas in this
publication, it made very little mention of them in its proposed regulation denying the health claims, instead
34focusing mostly on the fact that folic acid may not be eﬀective at doses lower than 4 mg.
The FDA’s third issue related to its denial of health claims is the diﬃculty in reaching the target population.
The FDA notes that there are approximately 70 million women of reproductive age in the U.S., of whom 4
million become pregnant each year, and 2,500 will have a pregnancy aﬀected by a neural tube defect. There-
fore, the FDA was uncertain how best to determine its target population, and then reach that entire target
population (while not excluding portions of it, such as economically disadvantaged members of the group)
while not harming the entire American population of 250 million. Complicating this decision, according to
the FDA, is the fact that the magnitude of the preventive eﬀects of diﬀerent levels of folic acid is unknown.
This leads to the FDA’s fourth issue regarding health claims: that an eﬀective minimum level of folic acid is
simply unknown. This concern stemmed from the fact that the eﬀects of folic acid in the diet were unknown
in most of the scientiﬁc studies, so dietary folate may have played some role in producing the results. There-
fore, it was diﬃcult for the FDA to determine what the minimum eﬀective amount of folic acid would be.
This is problematic because in order to ensure all women are protected before and during early pregnancy,
all women (and therefore, the entire population) would need to consume adequate levels of folic acid during
their entire childbearing period (which can be 30 years). This would result in the entire population ingesting
folic acid, and the FDA wanted to minimize lifetime exposure to prevent other potential problems. Thus
without a minimum eﬀective dose, the FDA seemed unwilling to allow widespread consumption of folic acid
at higher than necessary levels. A related concern was the FDA’s ﬁnal issue, and that is that the PHS pre-
sented three potential options (improved diets, fortiﬁcation of food, and dietary supplements) for ensuring
the target population receives adequate folic acid, so the FDA needed to determine which of the methods
best serves its goals.
35As evidenced by these issues, the FDA seemed reluctant to authorize health claims relating to folic acid’s
preventative eﬀect regarding neural tube defects largely because of potential unknown risks related to inges-
tion of levels of folic acid at levels higher than presently consumed. This concern is certainly valid, as any
step taken by the FDA which would increase the amount of folic acid consumed by the general population
would be severely criticized and could be devastating if high doses of folic acid turn out to be harmful in some
way. If the health concerns were as serious as the FDA described them as being, however, it is suspicious
that they were only used as a justiﬁcation for inaction after the FDA’s original justiﬁcation (that there was
not suﬃcient expert agreement as to the preventative eﬀects of folic acid at levels below 4 mg) was tarnished
by the PHS’s opposite ﬁnding.
FDA reverses its course
In the October 14, 1993, Federal Register, only nine months after again declining to authorize health claims
regarding the beneﬁts of folic acid in reducing neural tube defects, the FDA completely reversed course and
oﬀered what might be considered a three part folic acid package of proposed regulations.74 The FDA ﬁrst
proposed a series of regulations authorizing the folic acid-neural tube defect health claims and proposing
regulations which would govern the use of such claims. Second, the FDA proposed regulations to alter the
standards of identity for certain enriched foods so as to require the addition of folic acid to those products.
Finally, the FDA also proposed amendments to the food additive regulations so as to place limitations on
the amount of folic acid which could be added to foods. This section will describe the new regulations and
summarize the FDA’s reasoning for proposing them in the given form. It will also attempt to illuminate the
reasoning behind the FDA’s sudden reversal from the position articulated nine months earlier, which was
that the potential uncertain health risks were too great for folic acid to be used on a wide-spread basis. A
later section detailing the ﬁnal regulations will continue the discussion of the substance of the regulations,
74Food Labeling: Health claims and Label Statements; Folate and Neural Tube Defects, 58 Fed. Reg. 53254 (Oct. 14, 1993).
36highlighting those areas in which the ﬁnal regulations diﬀer from the proposed regulations.
In order to understand the health claims authorized by the FDA in 1993, it is ﬁrst necessary to understand
what took place during the previous nine months that caused the FDA to reverse the ﬁnal regulations which
did not allow for such health claims to be made. The ﬁrst item to note is that the timing of the January,
1993, ﬁnal rules declining to authorize the health claims was impacted by two factors. First, it was delayed
by the continuous release of new data. As was previously discussed, the comment period for the proposed
version of the rules was reopened in July, 1992, after it had been closed for ﬁve months, in order for the
FDA to take into consideration new data which was being released. This likely delayed the release of the
ﬁnal rules to at least the extent of the reopened comment period.
Despite the delay, the ﬁnal regulations were also impacted by the language of the NLEA. That act required
the FDA to issue proposed regulations on the ten nutrient-disease relationships (of which folic acid-neural
tube defects was one) within one year, which the FDA did when it denied the use of folic acid health claims.
It also required the FDA to issue ﬁnal regulations within two years. The end of the two year period was
drawing near when the FDA reopened the comment period in July, 1993, which likely placed the FDA
in a bind. If it did not act, the proposed regulations would have become ﬁnal, pursuant to the NLEA’s
hammer provision. So, while the FDA may have been nearly ready to authorize these health claims, the
fast approaching deadline may have oﬀered inadequate time to properly draft and propose new authorizing
regulations. This timing issue, combined with the fact that 1992 saw the release of both the results of the
Hungarian study and the PHS folic acid intake recommendation, probably contributed to the situation where
the FDA issued one set of ﬁnal regulations in January, only to completely reverse itself with new proposed
regulations in October of the same year.
37While the timing requirements of the NLEA and the timing of the Hungarian study results and the PHS
recommendation may explain the FDA’s seemingly contradictory actions during 1993, the fact that the two
sets of regulations are contradictory seems on its surface to be somewhat troubling. This is troubling because
in January, 1993, the FDA refused to permit folic acid health claims on products because it thought the
risks of increased folic acid intake might be harmful to certain groups within the U.S. population. Why, then
was the FDA willing to reverse course nine months later? The answer seems to be the general progression of
available information and, perhaps, external pressure placed on the agency. As was previously discussed, the
FDA ﬁrst refused to allow folic acid health claims because it declared that there was no consensus among the
scientiﬁc community as to the beneﬁts of folic acid at levels permissible under then-current regulations.75
Then, when the PHS reached the opposite conclusion based on the same scientiﬁc evidence, the FDA based
the ﬁnal rules declining authorization of health claims on the premise that the potential risks of increased
folic acid intake were unclear.76 Finally, in the proposed regulations authorizing folic acid health claims,
the FDA downplayed the problem of unknown risks by establishing a “safe upper limit of intake of 1 mg of
folate/day for all population groups.”77 By setting this upper limit, the FDA argued that it had “tentatively
concluded that [the] safety problems can be resolved.”78 By ﬁnding an upper limit to be helpful in mitigating
the potential safety issues, the FDA thus issued, with the proposed regulations currently at issue, proposed
food additive regulations relating to folic acid, which will be discussed in the following section.
Perhaps sensing that observers may be uneasy with the FDA’s complete reversal of course on an issue where
it previously found there to be potential health risks, the agency described each of the potential health risks
it noted in its January, 1993, release and explained why they were no longer a problem when coupled with
additional regulations which ensure the general population will ingest no more than 1 mg of folic acid per
75Food Labeling, supra note 56.
76Food Labeling, supra note 70.
77Food Labeling, supra note 72, at 53266.
78Id.
38day. The FDA ﬁrst addressed what seemed to be its most serious concern regarding folic acid’s risks – the
potential for folic acid to mask a vitamin B12 deﬁciency’s symptoms, complicating diagnosis while neurologic
damage continues. In the new proposed rules, the FDA clariﬁed its previous concern, noting that many of
the studies showing the potential masking eﬀect used doses of folic acid of 5 mg per day and higher. The
evidence of the masking eﬀect at levels of folic acid under 1 mg per day is much less convincing. Thus, the
FDA seemed more comfortable, although still not certain, that by keeping daily folic acid intakes below 1
mg per day the potential for masking of vitamin B12 deﬁciency should be limited.
The second concern the FDA previously raised was the unknown eﬀects of high levels of folic acid on pregnant
women and unborn fetuses. In the new proposed rules, the FDA still seemed concerned about this issue,
as the uncertainty remained. However, the FDA seemed to think the 1 mg per day cap on folic acid intake
was low enough to be safe. The third category of concern in the January, 1993, ﬁnal rules centered around
potential harms from high folic acid intake by people with epilepsy. While the FDA previously expressed
concern that folic acid may reduce the eﬀectiveness of anticonvulsant medications and exacerbate seizures, it
noted here that such studies used very high does of folic acid (5 mg to 75 mg per day). It also noted that in
a study using 3 to 5 mg of folic acid per day, there appeared to be no harmful eﬀect of folic acid in epileptics.
Thus, it again cited the 1 mg per day upper limit as the reason this concern is no longer prohibitive of health
claims.
The fourth health concern the FDA previously cited was that high levels of folic acid may be damaging to
people taking anti-folate medications for a wide variety of diseases. On this issue, the FDA noted several
studies which suggested that 1 mg per day of folic acid does not interfere with anti-folate medications, but
the FDA did request additional information on this area, as it seemed to remain unsatisﬁed by the data
available at that time. Thus, the FDA’s willingness to allow folic acid health claims, despite having serious
39safety concerns only nine months earlier, seems to be a product of two issues. First, the FDA’s fears may
not have been as extreme as the earlier rules portrayed, as a more revealing description of the data showed
that often the safety concerns arise only with very high levels of folic acid. Second, the FDA seems to have
satisﬁed itself that if the general population consumes less than 1 mg per day, it will not be ingesting enough
folic acid for the potential harms to be realized. Therefore, while certainly not erasing the safety issues, the
FDA seems to have at least convinced itself (either from outside pressure or from more review of the data)
that these issues can be avoided with appropriate restrictions in place.
The Requirements
The FDA’s proposed rules authorizing the use of health claims regarding folic acid and neural tube defects
were titled “Health claims: folate and neural tube defects.”79 The ﬁrst noteworthy point about the proposed
rule is the use of “folate” rather than “folic acid.” The FDA decided that folate was the more appropriate
word to use in the regulation, since it wanted to include both the natural food forms and the vitamin forms
under this rule.80 Because of this purposeful change in terminology used in the regulation, the term folate
will also be used here, when appropriate.
The requirements of the rules are classiﬁed into two categories: the more basic general requirements81 and
the more detailed speciﬁc requirements.82 The general requirements are mostly an inclusion by reference of
the general health claim requirements applicable to all health claims, as the rule requires that “[t]he health
claim for a food or supplement meets all of the general requirements of §101.14 for health claims, except
that a food or dietary supplement may qualify to bear the health claim if it meets the deﬁnition of the term
‘good source.”’ The requirements of §101.14 are indeed general and will only be discussed here to the extent
7921 C.F.R. § 101.79.
80Food Labeling, supra note 72, at 53280.
8121 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(1).
8221 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2).
40necessary. The more interesting part of the general requirement is that foods may carry a folic acid health
claim if they meet the deﬁnition of “good source.” The standard requirement for health claims, speciﬁed
in §101.14(d)(2)(vii), is that foods must be “high” in the particular substance at issue. The term “high” in
this case is deﬁned, along with the terms “rich in” and “excellent source of,” to be permissibly used on food
labels containing at least 20% of the RDI of a particular substance.83 “Good source,” on the other hand, is
part of the less stringent terms, including “contains” and “provides,” which are permissible if the product
contains 10% to 19% of the RDI of a particular substance.84 The FDA proposed to allow health claims
regarding folate when a food contains as little as 10% of the RDI of folate because “folate is ubiquitously
distributed among many foods in the U.S. food supply.”85 The FDA noted that although many vegetables,
including okra, broccoli, spinach, turnip greens, Brussels sprouts, and others, do contain enough folate per
serving (more than 20% of the RDI) to qualify for “high” status, the “great majority of foods contain folate
at lower levels.”86 For example, the FDA notes that oranges, grapefruit, many berries, cabbage, lettuce,
corn, cauliﬂower, peas, many vegetable juices, beets, and parsnips contain enough folate per serving (10% to
19% of the RDI) to qualify as a “good source” but not enough to qualify as “high.” Because so many foods
contain small, but not inconsequential, levels of folate, and eating a diet in accordance with the current
dietary guidelines would provide enough of those foods to provide, in total, the RDI of folate, the FDA
proposed allowing folate health claims on products with lower levels of folate.
Beyond the above general requirements, the FDA’s proposed rules under §101.79 also contain several spe-
ciﬁc requirements, which form the crux of the guidelines for the proposed health claims. First, and most
importantly, the proposed rules allow the use of “[a] health claim that women who are capable of becoming
pregnant and who consume adequate amounts of folate daily during their childbearing years may reduce
8321 C.F.R. § 101.54(b).
8421 C.F.R. § 101.54(c).
85Food Labeling, supra note 72, at 53281.
86Id.
41their risk of having a pregnancy aﬀected by spina biﬁda or other neural tube defects.” In making such a
claim, the FDA requires manufacturers to specify several items, including the nutrient at issue. The FDA
allows manufactures to use the following terms in describing the nutrient: “folate,” “folic acid,” “folacin,”
“folate, a B vitamin,” “folic acid, a B vitamin,” or “folacin, a B vitamin” in meeting this requirement. Both
“folate” and “folacin” were allowable terms and synonyms under the current regulatory structure, and “folic
acid” was added here because of its use in the PHS recommendation.
The FDA also requires manufacturers making the health claim to specify the health condition, allowing them
to use any of the following descriptions: “neural tube defects,” “birth defects, spina biﬁda, or anencephaly,”
“birth defects of the brain or spinal cord, anencephaly or spina biﬁda,” or “spina biﬁda or anencephaly, birth
defects of the brain or spinal cord” in so doing. The FDA chose these speciﬁc variants because they allow
manufacturers to provide terms with which the public may be familiar (since neural tube defects may not be
a phrase known to many people), but also are speciﬁc enough so as not to lead women to believe that folate
may prevent all birth defects. Exactly which phrases the FDA meant to propose is somewhat unclear, as in
the explanatory test accompanying the proposed rules, the FDA states that the proposed rule contains “the
birth defect spina biﬁda,” although the text of §101.79(c)(2)(i)(C) does not include this language. Also, the
explanatory text includes the phrase “the birth defects spina biﬁda and anencephaly,” while the text of the
rule instead states “birth defects, spina biﬁda, or anencephaly.” These oversights, although troublesome in
that they occur in such a speciﬁc, text-based section of the rule, appear corrected in the ﬁnal rule, discussed
below.
The proposed rules also place several other speciﬁc requirements on potential health claims. First, the FDA
42proposed to require the health claims state that neural tube defects have many potential causes, while also
not implying that folate intake is the only factor in determining risk.87 Also, the rules require that health
claims state that neural tube defects are not widespread but are very serious, so as not to mislead women
into thinking they are common.88 Furthermore, health claims may not make reference to “any speciﬁc degree
of reduction in risk of neural tube defects” which may be attributed to folate.89 Health claims may not,
therefore, make reference to the PHS estimate that folate intake could reduce by 50% the prevalence of
neural tube defects.
Dietary supplements and fortiﬁed foods must also carry an additional statement if they contain more than
25% of the RDI of folate. If they include a health claim related to folate, they must also state that 1 mg
per day is the safe upper limit of folate intake.90 The FDA proposed to require this extra warning in these
cases so people can monitor their intake of these foods. The FDA did not believe that monitoring was
necessary in foods with less folate. Under the proposed rules, however, no foods are permitted to state that
a certain amount of folate is more eﬀective in preventing neural tube defects than a lower amount.91 This,
the FDA stated, is consistent with the research showing that general dietary improvement yields a reduction
of risk. Finally, all foods with folate health claims must also identify diets adequate in folate through the
use of such phrases as “Adequate amounts of folate, a B vitamin, can be obtained from diets rich in fruits,
including citrus fruits and juices, vegetables, including dark green leafy vegetables and legumes, enriched
grain products, including breads, rice, and pasta, fortiﬁed cereals, or a dietary supplement.”92 These long,
wordy statements are designed to ensure women learn ways to improve their overall diet so as to include
8721 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(i)(D).
8821 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(i)(E).
8921 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(i)(F).
9021 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(i)(G).
9121 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(i)(H).
9221 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(ii)(B).
43adequate folate.
The FDA also included in the proposed rules several rules of a more technical variety. First, the health
claims may only be used on dietary supplements which meet the United States Pharmacopoeia standards
for disintegration and dissolution. This will ensure the folate contained in a dietary supplement will be
absorbed into the body.93 Second, no foods containing more than 100% of the RDI for vitamin A as retinol
or preformed vitamin A or vitamin D may bear a folic acid health claim.94 The reasoning behind this
rule is the fear that women may attempt to increase their folic acid intake by consuming more products
containing folate, and if those products contain high levels of certain forms of vitamin A or D, they could
ingest excessive levels of those vitamins. Excessive vitamin A has been associated with birth defects, and
excessive vitamin D is potentially toxic, so the FDA included this rule in an attempt to ensure women do
not receive excessive amounts of those vitamins. Third, any product bearing a folic acid health claim must
include the amount of folate per serving in the nutrition label.95 And, ﬁnally, products may not bear a
folate health claim if they contain certain high levels of fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, or sodium.96 However,
in addition to these technical requirements, the FDA does provide for certain optional information to be
included in the claim, such as the relationship between folate and neural tube defects, a recommendation
that women with a history of neural tube defects should consult their doctor, and a statement showing the
recommended daily value of folate is 400µg97 (0.4 mg).98
These many restrictions and requirements seem extremely cumbersome, to the point that a health claim
9321 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(ii)(C).
9421 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(iii).
9521 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(iv).
9621 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(4).
97Throughout the paper, I use the units of measure speciﬁed by the speciﬁc cited authority. For conversion purposes, 1 mg
is equal to 1,000 µg.
9821 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(3)(i), (ii), (iii).
44must be very long in order to meet the requirements. The FDA provided several examples of model health
claims, and they illustrate this problem. The following is one of those, and is the shortest of the examples
provided by the FDA:
Women who consume adequate amounts of folate, a B vitamin, daily throughout their
childbearing years may reduce their risk of having a child with a neural tube defect. Such
birth defects, while not widespread, are very serious. They can have many causes. Adequate
amounts of folate can be obtained from diets rich in fruits, dark green leafy vegetables and
legumes, enriched grain products, fortiﬁed cereals, or a supplement. Folate consumption
should be limited to 100µg per day from all sources.99
This example shows how long a health claim likely needs to be in order to satisfy the requirements of §101.14
and §101.79. Whether this is prohibitively long will be discussed later.
Fortiﬁcation
By proposing to authorize folate health claims, the FDA created the possibility that food manufacturers
might add folic acid to their products in order to place the health claim on the products. This could have
resulted in the U.S. population ingesting high, and perhaps dangerous, levels of folate. However, if the FDA
restricted the addition of folate to foods, women of childbearing age might not receive enough, thus limiting
the protective beneﬁts. Therefore, at the same time as it proposed rules related to the folate health claims,
the FDA also proposed a fortiﬁcation policy to add folate to certain foods and proposed changes in the food
additive rules to restrict the foods to which folate could be added. A discussion of the fortiﬁcation program
follows, with a discussion of the amendments to the food additive regulations commencing following that
discussion.
Since neural tube defects occur very early in pregnancy, before many women know they are pregnant, the
FDA decided that fortiﬁcation of the food supply would increase the likelihood that women of childbearing
age would receive adequate folate. However, the goal of ensuring that women of childbearing age receive
adequate folate must be balanced with a goal of preventing excess folate intake in any segment of the popula-
45tion. In order to achieve both of these goals, the FDA had to consider many issues, including which products
to fortify, what levels of fortiﬁcation to require, what safe upper limit of folate intake to adopt, what level of
bioavailability of folate and folic acid in foods to require, and what estimates of likely daily folate ingestion
would be accurate. Only after consideration these issues was the FDA able to propose a plan for folic acid
fortiﬁcation.
The ﬁrst issue the FDA needed to consider was which foods to fortify with folic acid. The fortiﬁcation of
the U.S. food supply began in the 1940s, when the FDA created a standard of identity for several enriched
cereal-grain products.100 To qualify to bear the label “enriched,” the products had to contain certain levels of
thiamin, riboﬂavin, niacin, and iron. The FDA deemed the addition of these nutrients necessary in order to
both replace nutrients lost during milling and to ensure adequate dietary intake. Cereal-grain products were
selected for fortiﬁcation because they met certain criteria for carriers of nutritional fortiﬁcation and were
consumed by a “signiﬁcant portion of the population in an amount adequate to meaningfully increase intakes
of [the] nutrient.”101 In determining foods to consider for folate fortiﬁcation, the FDA again looked for foods
which were a staple consumed by a signiﬁcant portion of the target population. The FDA considered cereal-
grain products, fruit juices, dairy products, and breakfast cereals as candidates for fortiﬁcation. Speciﬁcally
within the cereal-grain category, the FDA considered foods with established standards of identity, including
the following “enriched” products: bread, rolls, and buns; wheat, corn, and rice ﬂours; corn grits; corn meals;
farinas; rice; macaroni products; and noodle products. Among the non-cereal-grain products with standards
of identity which the FDA considered were milk, yogurt, fruit juices, and canned fruit nectars. None of the
standards of identity for these foods allowed, at that time, the addition of folate.
Once the FDA had its selection of potential fortiﬁcation candidates, it then needed to determine the ap-
propriate level of fortiﬁcation before choosing one of the candidates. This was a complicated procedure,
100Food Labeling, supra note 72, at 53271.
101Id.
46requiring the FDA to consider how much folate in foods would be absorbed into the body (bioavailability),
how much folate people were likely to ingest, and how much folate could be ingested safely over the long
term. As has previously been mentioned, the FDA determined that 1 mg should be considered the safe
upper limit of daily folate intake so as to minimize the potential for unknown complications to arise related
to high folate intake. However, determining the 1 mg limit also required the FDA to examine whether the 1
mg should include all folate or just added folic acid (from fortiﬁcation or dietary supplements), and whether
the 1 mg limit was too low to allow women of childbearing age to consume enough folate to receive the
protective beneﬁts. The FDA concluded that the 1 mg limit was high enough that, given the proper forti-
ﬁcation program, most target women would regularly consume the RDA of folate through their diets. The
FDA determined that the limit would be for all folates, not just added folic acid. The FDA also determined
that in using the 1 mg upper limit, it would not consider the bioavailability of various forms of folate, even
though it had been presented with evidence that folic acid added to foods and supplements is more easily
absorbed by the body than natural folates found in foods. The FDA had also been given evidence that folate
is absorbed diﬀerently when consumed with certain foods and beverages. However, due to the complicated
nature of these issues, the FDA decided not to include these issues in its determination of levels of folate
consumed as part of the 1 mg per day maximum.
In determining the amount of folate to include in fortiﬁed foods and dietary supplements, the FDA used the
Department of Agriculture’s Nationwide Food Consumption Survey (“NFCS”) on individual intake during
1987-1988.102 The NFCS was a survey in which respondents provided data on their diets over a three day
period. From that, the researchers estimated the daily food and nutrient intake of the U.S. population and its
various subgroups. The FDA used this data to determine the level of folate intake per day for various groups
in the population. It then used various scenarios of fortiﬁcation (for example, the FDA considered a scenario
102United States Department of Agriculture, Nationwide Food Consumption Survey/Individual Intake 1987-1988, accession
number PB90-504044, National Technical Information Service, Springﬁeld, VA, 1990.
47in which grain products contained 70 µg of folic acid per 100 g, or one in which certain juices contained 140
µg of folic acid per 100g) and recalculated folate intakes using the hypothetical levels of fortiﬁcation. The
FDA noted, however, that using this method could present two diﬀerent errors: it could underestimate the
amount of food typically eaten, and it could underestimate the folate content of the foods eaten.
According to the FDA, the amounts of food typically reported by volunteers in the NFCS survey only
provided 70% of the amount of calories necessary for these people to maintain their present weight, indicating
that people underreported the food they ate. Therefore, the FDA took into account this potential 30%
underreporting by using the 95th percentile of calorie intake to estimate folate intake for “high” consumers
and used the 25th percentile to estimate the folate intake for “low” consumers. The second potential for error
is that methods for determining folate levels in foods often produce inaccurate results, and manufacturers
who report nutrient levels on nutrition labels often add extra of the nutrient in order to ensure the product
contains at least the amount on the label. These issues complicate the determination of actual folate intake,
probably producing an actual folate intake higher than the estimated intake. Despite these issues, the FDA
decided only to use the upward adjustment in calorie intake described above to correct for these potential
problems.
After considering the potential for error, the FDA tested folate intakes in 12 diﬀerent fortiﬁcation scenarios.
It determined that fortiﬁcation of cereal-grain products, fruit juices, and dairy products was not a viable
alternative, as it resulted in high consumers in most population groups consuming over 1,000 µg per day
without supplements. In fact, children 1 to 10 years old who were high consumers were estimated to ingest
over 4,000 µg per day. Therefore, the FDA concluded that fortiﬁcation of dairy and juice products should not
48be permitted. In focusing on fortifying cereal-grain products, the FDA considered three levels of fortiﬁcation:
70, 140, and 350 µg of folic acid per 100 g. Running the estimates with these numbers showed that while
350 µg pushed some high users beyond the 1 mg per day maximum, the lower two amounts kept all high
user groups below the maximum.
The FDA also calculated the likely folate intake for consumers following the USDA Food Guide Pyramid,
determining that whether low or high consumers reached the RDA or exceeded the 1 mg maximum depended
on whether they included as part of their diet a breakfast cereal fortiﬁed with either 25% or 100% of the RDA
of folate. When the diet included a breakfast cereal with 100% of the RDA, some consumers, especially high
consumers age 51 and up and males age 19 to 50, would exceed the 1 mg per day maximum with a fortiﬁcation
of cereal-grain products at the 140 and 350 µg per day level. However, 70 µg per day fortiﬁcation would
not provide enough folate for many women of childbearing age. Therefore, the FDA proposed to require
fortiﬁcation of enriched foods at 140 µg per 100 g and to limit breakfast cereals to 100 µg per serving, while
allowing dietary supplements to contain up to 400 µg per serving. At this level, no consumer groups would
be likely to exceed the daily maximum, and even women in the low categories could ingest at least 230 µg
per day. Although this is not the RDA, the FDA noted that there is evidence that even that level could
reduce the risk of a neural tube defect. Thus, the FDA settled on this scheme for fortiﬁcation, even though
all of the target population would not likely receive the RDA, because a higher level might put some groups
in danger.
Food Additives
By proposing a fortiﬁcation program to ensure women of childbearing age receive adequate folate from food
sources at the same time as it proposed authorization of health claims regarding folic acid and neural tube
49defects, the FDA created a situation in which the U.S. population might receive very high quantities of folic
acid. Since the fortiﬁcation program was designed to provide adequate folate from cereal-grain products
and breakfast cereals, if manufacturers began adding folic acid to their products in order to utilize the new
health claims, there was a possibility that a large percentage of foods might contain folic acid. Therefore,
as the ﬁnal piece to its three part plan, the FDA simultaneously proposed amendments to the food additive
regulations which would prevent folic acid from being added to foods other than breakfast cereals and those
foods with standards of identity requiring the addition of folic acid.103 Additionally, the amendments were
to limit the amount of folic acid added to breakfast cereals.
Until 1993, when the folic acid plan was proposed, folic acid had been treated in the regulations under a
plan dating back to 1973.104 The regulation allowed folic acid to be added to foods so long as the maximum
intake of the food (or dietary supplement) typically consumed during a one day period would not provide
consumers with more than 0.4 mg of folic acid per day.105 Additionally, that number was 0.1 mg for infant
foods, 0.3 mg for foods for children under 4, and 0.8 mg for pregnant or lactating women. Under that rule,
however, manufacturers would be free to add 0.4 mg of folic acid to each serving of their products, potentially
resulting in a situation where many foods each contained the RDA for folic acid. This would far surpass the
FDA’s 1.0 mg per day target maximum.
Therefore, the FDA proposed a new food additive amendment for folic acid containing several basic provi-
sions.106 First, the new regulation would allow dietary supplements to continue to contain 0.4 mg of folic
acid, as the FDA considered that amount to be safe. Second, the new regulation would allow foods with new
standards of identity requiring folic acid fortiﬁcation to be fortiﬁed with the proper amount of folic acid.
103Food Additives Permitted for Direct Addition to Food for Human Consumption; Folic Acid (Folacin), 58 Fed. Reg. 53312
(Oct. 14, 1993).
10438 FR 20725.
105Previous §172.345. See also 58 FR 53312 at 53313.
106Proposed §172.345. See also 58 FR 53312 at 53317.
50Third, infant formulas would continue to be permitted to contain added folic acid in a manner consistent with
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Foods used under medical supervision would also be exempted
from the new regulations. Finally, folic acid would be permitted to be added to breakfast cereals at a rate
of no more than 0.1 mg per serving. Thus, breakfast cereals were really the only food without a standard of
identity to which folic acid could be added. The 0.1 mg per serving maximum was somewhat controversial
in that it would require the reformulation of several cereals which contained the full RDA of folic acid at
the time the regulation was proposed. However, breakfast cereals containing more than 0.1 mg of folic acid
were not singled out, as any food which did not fall into one of the above categories and contained added
folic acid would need to be reformulated under the proposed regulation. This was necessary, according to
the FDA, to ensure that the amount of folate consumed by the population was adequately controlled.
Thus, three years after the passage of the NLEA, and one year after the PHS made its folic acid recommen-
dation, the FDA had proposed regulations which completely overhauled its treatment of folic acid. Instead of
allowing manufacturers of non-standardized foods to include a full day’s worth of folic acid in their products,
the FDA created a comprehensive system to deliver adequate folate to women of childbearing age while not
delivering excessive folate to any segment of the population. Through fortiﬁcation of standardized foods
and breakfast cereals, authorization of health claims regarding folic acid and neural tube defects, and the
prevention of folic acid addition to other foods, the FDA hoped to provide for an adequate, but controlled,
supply of folate to passively reach thousands of people. As will be seen, however, even though the FDA
proposed this program in October, 1993, and provided for a short two-month comment period, it would be
years before rules were ﬁnalized and implemented.
The Final Rules
Despite the fact that the FDA proposed the folate package of regulations in late 1993, it was not until March
51of 1996 that it issued the ﬁnal regulations.107 During the nearly two and a half year period between the
issuance of the proposed and ﬁnal regulations, the FDA received nearly 100 comments regarding its proposals.
The comments came from a wide variety of sources, including government agencies, a foreign government,
state governments, consumer advocacy groups, and manufacturers of foods and dietary supplements, among
others. Thus, this section presents an overview of the most important comments, including those which
prompted the FDA to alter the proposed regulations, in an attempt to highlight the diﬀerences between
the proposed and ﬁnal rules. It should be noted, however, that these ﬁnal rules apply to both conventional
foods and to dietary supplements. Dietary supplements did receive certain diﬀering treatment prior to the
enactment of these regulations, but that will be addressed in a later section.
Although the FDA received comments favoring and criticizing nearly every aspect of the proposed health
claims regulations, it decided not to alter most of the provisions. However, the FDA did alter certain
aspects of the regulations in response to the comments it received, and the vast majority of the alterations
were designed to simplify the required parts of the authorized health claims in some way. For example, one
change the FDA made throughout the regulations was to require that all references to an amount of folate be
expressed in a percentage of the RDI, with an option for the microgram equivalent to be used in parentheses.
This was designed to limit confusion that may result from using diﬀerent measures to express the relevant
amounts of folate. Similarly, the FDA also decided to permit, as part of the required identiﬁcation of the
health-related condition, manufacturers to use “birth defects of the brain or spinal cord” or “brain or spinal
cord birth defects” to eliminate confusion in women who are not familiar with the more technical terms like
neural tube defects, spina biﬁda, or anencephaly.108
Many other of the FDA’s alterations were the product of a desire to allow the claims to be as simple
107Food Labeling, supra note 4 at 8752.
10821 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(i)(C).
52and succinct as possible. The FDA noted that the use of health claims was not as widespread as it had
anticipated, and it attributed that at least partly to the fact that the required health claims may be too long.
Therefore, it made several changes designed to decrease the required elements for health claims. As part of
this eﬀort, the FDA removed the requirement that health claims needed to contain examples of foods which
could be included in a diet to increase folate intake. Instead, the claims need only state that folate should
be consumed as part of a healthy diet.109 Also, the FDA altered the requirement that dietary supplements
or foods containing more than 25% of the RDI of folate carry a cautionary statement regarding excessive
folate intake. Instead, the FDA decided to require the statement only on foods and supplements containing
more than 100% of the RDI of folate.110 The FDA and some commentators worried, in addition to the
length problem, that such a low threshold might result in too many caution statements, possibly resulting
in an eﬀort by women to avoid foods with folate. The FDA also eliminated the requirement that health
claims state that neural tube defects have many causes, as it decided that the requirement that health claims
not imply that folate is the only risk factor in neural tube defects should achieve the necessary educational
purpose. Finally, the FDA also eliminated the required statement that the prevalence of neural tube defects
is low.
Thus, when the health claims authorization went into eﬀect on April 19, 1996, the FDA had streamlined
the initial requirements to make the health claims both potentially easier for consumers to understand and
easier for manufacturers to implement. As was noted in the previous section, under the proposed rules, even
the shortest example of a health claim including all of the required statements was prohibitively long. Under
the ﬁnal rules, a health claim could be as short as “Adequate folate in healthful diets may reduce a woman’s
risk of having a child with a brain or spinal cord birth defect.”111 This claim, being much shorter than was
previously required, was thought to be more appealing to both consumer and manufacturers, thus increasing
10921 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(i)(H).
11021 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(i)(F).
11121 C.F.R. § 101.79(d)(1)(ii).
53the likelihood that women of childbearing age would be able to more easily identify foods high in folate.
In the same issue of the Federal Register, the FDA also issued its ﬁnal rules regarding the folate fortiﬁcation
program.112 Like the ﬁnal health claims rules, the ﬁnal fortiﬁcation rules were accompanied by a discussion
of the 170 letters the FDA received regarding the proposed rules. However, the ﬁnal fortiﬁcation rules only
diﬀer in one way from the proposed rules: the ﬁnal rules were to become eﬀective two years after issuance, as
opposed to one year under the proposed rules. The FDA made this change to allow manufacturers adequate
time to exhaust their inventory of packaging before making the necessary folate-related changes to the post-
fortiﬁcation packaging. Also, the two year delay would give manufacturers time to properly reformulate
their products to include folate. However, it is worth noting that this delay pushed the eﬀective date for the
fortiﬁcation program back to January 1, 1998, which is over seven years after the agency was ﬁrst required
to act on the folate-neural tube defects situation by the NLEA.
The other noteworthy aspect of the text accompanying the ﬁnal fortiﬁcation rules is the FDA’s analysis of
the economic costs of the program relative to the vitamin B12/pernicious anemia situation, which was the
FDA’s main reason for not implementing the folate program in the ﬁrst place. Using data released after the
proposed regulations had been issued in 1993, the FDA determined that each case of neurologic disability
resulting from low levels of folate masking pernicious anemia would result in a utility loss of, on average,
$537,948. Including medical bills, the average cost per case was estimated at $570,000. The FDA calculated
the annual beneﬁts to society of folate fortiﬁcation at between $220 and $700 million. This results in a
break-even number of neurologic disability cases of between 386 and 1,228 annually, which are the number of
neurologic disability cases resulting from the folic acid changes that can occur before the new policy becomes
more expensive and harmful than the previous one. This seems to compare favorably to the potential for 500
cases of folate-caused neurologic disabilities estimated to occur based on the one study the FDA cited. This
112Food Standards: Amendment of Standards of Identity for Enriched Grain Products to Require Addition of Folic Acid, 61
Fed. Reg. 8781 (March 5, 1996).
54is interesting in that while it shows the potential for a net gain by society from the folate fortiﬁcation, the
gain is by no means guaranteed since the societal losses, in the form of neurologic disabilities, may outweigh
the societal beneﬁts from the prevention of a percentage of neural tube defects.
The amendments to the food additive regulations are the third piece of the folate package and were also
published in ﬁnal form in March of 1996.113 Like the fortiﬁcation rules, the food additive amendments
diﬀered little from those proposed over two and a half years earlier. Although it seems that many of the 59
letters the FDA received on the topic argued for a safe upper limit of either more or less than the proposed
400 µg per day, the FDA determined that adequate evidence for changing that limit did not exist, so the
limit remained unchanged. The FDA did, however, make two changes of note to the proposals. The ﬁrst
change allowed manufacturers to add folate to meal-replacement products.114 The rationale for this was that
meal-replacement products are typically intended to serve as an entire meal, and since they are consumed
in place of other foods, they should be allowed to contain folate. Thus, the FDA added a rule allowing
meal-replacements which are consumed once per day to contain 400 µg of folate, while those intended to
be consumed more than once per day may contain 200 µg. The FDA noted that the safe upper limit of
folate was not a serious worry with meal-replacements because their volume and caloric nature make their
use self-limiting.
This self-limiting quality also played a part in the FDA’s other change to the proposals: allowing breakfast
cereals to contain 400 µg folate, rather than being restricted to 100 µg. The FDA’s original goal in proposing
the limitation was to avoid excessive folate intakes in groups consuming multiple bowls of breakfast cereal per
day. However, the comments received persuaded the FDA that breakfast cereals, like meal replacements, are
self-limiting. This therefore seemed inconsistent with the plan’s allowance of dietary supplements, which are
not self-limiting, to contain 400 µg. Additionally, the FDA noted that only three to six percent of breakfast
113Food Additives Permitted for Direct Addition to Food for Human Consumption; Folic Acid (Folacin), 61 Fed. Reg. 8797
(March 5, 1996).
11421 C.F.R. § 172.345(h).
55cereals actually contained 400 µg of folate, and the remainder will not have an incentive to add folate above
100 µg because 100 µg allows them to qualify for use of folate health claims. Thus, these assumptions
persuaded the FDA to remove the lower limitation on folic acid addition to breakfast cereals and allow them
to contain the full RDI per serving.115
Dietary Supplements
Once the ﬁnal regulations went into eﬀect, that may have seemed like the end of the FDA’s nearly decade-
long struggle to develop a policy regarding folate. The struggle was not over, however, in the area of dietary
supplements. Although the discussion to this point has treated the folate situation for food and dietary
supplements as being the same, there were actually some slight diﬀerences in the treatment of foods and
dietary supplements which led to several years of litigation following the enactment of the ﬁnal regulations.
In the NLEA, Congress directed the FDA to authorize health claims for foods only when the FDA determines,
“based on the totality of publicly available scientiﬁc evidence (including evidence from well-designed studies
conducted in a manner which is consistent with generally recognized scientiﬁc procedures and principles),
that there is signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement, among experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience to
evaluate such claims, that the claim is supported by such evidence.”116 Thus, Congress gave the FDA the
standard with which it was to evaluate health claims regarding foods. But with dietary supplements, though,
Congress was more lenient, stating only that such health claims made regarding dietary supplements were to
“be subject to a procedure and standard, respecting the validity of such a claim, established by regulation
of the Secretary.”117 So for health claims regarding dietary supplements, Congress delegated determination
of a standard of review to the FDA. As explained by the House Floor Manager:
115Three months later, FDA revoked the standard of identity for corn grits, enriched corn grits, quick grits and yellow grits
(“grits”) and added grits to the list of non-standardized foods to which folic acid may be added. See 61 Fed. Reg. 27771 and
§ 172.345(d).
11642 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i).
11742 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D).
56The FDA is given the discretion to deﬁne both the procedure and the standard because the principals
in the Senate could not agree on the appropriate procedure or the appropriate standard. It is obvious
from the language that the agency could adopt the same procedure and standard that Congress has
adopted for disease claims on food other than vitamins; it is also obvious that it could adopt a
stronger standard for vitamins, minerals herbs, and other similar nutritional substances.118
Thus, the FDA was left to determine the standard for dietary supplements.
Before the FDA could act, Congress in 1992 passed the Dietary Supplement Act of 1992 (“DS Act”).119
The DS Act prohibited the FDA from implementing the NLEA with respect to dietary supplements prior
to December 15, 1993. Also, it required the FDA to issue proposed regulations to implement the NLEA
regarding dietary supplements by June 15, 1993, and the proposed regulations were to become ﬁnal if
ﬁnal regulations were not established by December 15, 1993. Therefore, when the FDA proposed its ﬁnal
rules regarding health claims, generally, on January 6, 1993, they applied only to foods. The FDA then
made dietary supplements subject to the same rules in a June 18, 1993 proposal.120 Then, as discussed
previously, on October 14, 1993, the FDA proposed rules authorizing a folate-neural tube defect health
claim which, because of the June 18, 1993, proposal, would apply in the same manner to both foods and
dietary supplements. Because of the hammer provision of the DS Act, though, the proposed rules became
ﬁnal by operation of law on December 31, 1993, insofar as they applied to dietary supplements, since the
FDA had not yet published ﬁnal rules.121 When the FDA enacted the ﬁnal rules regarding folate health
claims on March 5, 1996, it therefore had to revoke the proposed rule which had become ﬁnal for dietary
supplements and replace it with the ﬁnal rules.122
119Dietary Supplement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571 (1992).
12058 Fed. Reg. 33700 (June 18, 1993).
121Food Labeling: Health Claims and Label Statements; Folate and Neural tube Defects, 59 Fed. Reg. 433 (Jan. 4, 1994).
122Food Labeling, supra note 4, at 8753.
57By 1996, therefore, the FDA had enacted regulations which treated dietary supplements and conventional
foods the same regarding the folate health claims. In fact, the FDA seemed convinced at that point that
0.4 mg of folate daily in any form was satisfactory. It had received comments criticizing the section of the
proposed rules which banned claims stating “that a speciﬁed amount of folate per serving from one source
is more eﬀective in reducing the risk of neural tube defects than a lower amount per serving from another
source.”123 These critical comments came from dietary supplement marketers Durk Pearson and Sandy
Shaw, joined by the American Preventive Medical Association, which is a health care advocacy organization
composed of health care practitioners (“Pearson Plaintiﬀs”).124 The Pearson Plaintiﬀs had asked the FDA
to authorize a claim stating “.8 mg of folic acid in a dietary supplement is more eﬀective in reducing the risk
of neural tube defects than a lower amount in foods in common form”125 (“0.8 claim”). The FDA denied
the claim stating ﬁrst that “the scientiﬁc literature does not support the superiority of any one source over
others” and second that the scientiﬁc literature and the comments submitted did not provide “a basis for
stating that a speciﬁc amount of folate is more eﬀective than another amount.”126
The Pearson Plaintiﬀs ﬁled suit against the FDA in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.127 In the suit, the plaintiﬀs challenged the FDA’s denial of not only the folic acid claim, but
also the denial of claims regarding dietary ﬁber and cancer, antioxidant vitamins and cancer, and omega-3
fatty acids and coronary heart disease. Although the Pearson Plaintiﬀs based their claim on a number of
grounds, the case ultimately came down to two. First, they claimed that by not allowing them to make
the 0.8 claim accompanied by some sort of disclaimer, the FDA had violated their First Amendment rights.
Second, they claimed that by not giving the “signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement” requirement a deﬁnition, but
using that phrase as the reason for denial of their claims, the FDA violated the Administrative Procedure
12321 C.F.R. § 101.79(c)(2)(i)(H) in proposed rules, redesignated as §101.79(c)(2)(i)(G) in ﬁnal rules.
124Pearson et al. v. Shalala, et al. 164 F.3d 650, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
125Pearson et al. v. Shalala, et al. 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 108 (D.D.C. 2001).
126Food Labeling, supra note 4, at 8760.
127Pearson et al. v. Shalala, et al. 14 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 1998).
58Act (“APA”). Although the District Court granted the FDA’s motion to dismiss and held for the FDA on
all claims, the Circuit Court reversed and held against the FDA on both of the aforementioned grounds.128
Regarding the FDA’s refusal to allow the 0.8 claim accompanied by a qualifying disclaimer, the Circuit Court
placed emphasis on whether the claim was inherently misleading or only potentially misleading. It said that if
the claim was inherently misleading, it may be prohibited. But, if the claim was only potentially misleading,
the FDA would need to meet the standards of the Central Hudson129 test for evaluating governmental
regulation of potentially misleading commercial speech.130 Under this test, although the court found that
the FDA’s interest in the regulation was substantial (protecting public health and preventing consumer
fraud), and that the prohibition was directly advancing the FDA’s interest, the court found that the FDA’s
prohibition was potentially not reasonably related to achieving its goals.131 The court noted that there is
generally a preference for more disclosure rather than suppression of speech, which would lean in favor of
allowing the 0.8 claim accompanied by a disclaimer rather than banning the claim completely. The court
therefore remanded the issue to the FDA to provide evidence that a disclaimer could not cure the health
claim.
Regarding the APA claim, the court noted that the APA prohibits agencies from engaging in “arbitrary and
capricious action.”132 The court held that under this principle, “it must be possible for the regulated class
to perceive the principles which are guiding agency action.”133 By not giving any clarifying explanation
of “signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement,” but still using it as a basis for rejecting the claims, the FDA was not
complying with the APA. Thus, the court remanded this issue to the FDA to “explain what it means by
signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement or, at minimum, what it does not mean.”134 Because of this issue, and
128164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
129Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
130Id. at 656.
131Id. at 657.
132Id. at 660.
133Id. at 661.
134Id.
59the First Amendment disclaimer issue, the court invalidated §101.79(c)(2)(i)(G), which, as discussed above,
prohibited claims that one type of folate was superior to another type at a diﬀerent level, as well as those
regulations relating to the other nutrient-disease relationships challenged by the Pearson Plaintiﬀs.
The FDA’s reaction to the Pearson decision was somewhat slow in coming. Nine months after the decision,
the FDA published a request for scientiﬁc data related to the nutrient-disease relationships at hand in the
case as part of an eﬀort to reevaluate the scientiﬁc evidence at issue.135 Then, on December 1, 1999, over
10 months after the Pearson decision, the FDA outlined its plan for implementation of the decision.136 The
multi-part plan included, in addition to reevaluating the scientiﬁc data regarding the nutrient-disease claims
at issue, issuing a clariﬁcation of the “signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement” standard and conducting rulemaking
regarding dietary supplements in general and rulemaking regarding the Pearson claims. The clariﬁcation of
the “signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement” standard came in the FDA’s “Guidance for the Industry: Signiﬁcant
Scientiﬁc Agreement in the Review of Health Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements,”
which the FDA made available in December of 1999. Then, 18 months after the Pearson decision, the
FDA ﬁnally revoked the regulations which denied authorization of claims regarding the substance-disease
relationships which had been struck down by the court.137 Although the regulations had been struck down
and were revoked, manufacturers were still not able to make claims such as the 0.8 claim because the FDA
still refused to authorize the claims.
One week after revoking the invalidated regulations, the FDA on October 10, 2000, issued a letter decision in
which it again denied authorization of the 0.8 claim, even with qualifying disclaimers. In so doing, the FDA
broke the 0.8 claim down into three parts. First, it evaluated whether 0.8 mg of folic acid is more eﬀective
135Food Labeling: Health Claims and Label Statements; Request for Scientiﬁc Data and Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 48841
(Sept. 8, 1999).
136Food Labeling: Health Claims and Label Statements for Dietary Supplements; Strategy for Implementation of Pearson
Court Decision, 64 Fed. Reg. 67289 (Dec. 1, 1999).
137Food Labeling: Health Claims and Labeling Statements;... Folate and Neural Tube Defects; Revocation, 65 Fed. Reg.
58917 (Oct. 3, 2000).
60than a lower amount, and found that the scientiﬁc evidence was unclear and did not support the conclusion.
Second, it evaluated the compositional component of claiming that dietary supplements are more eﬀective
than foods in common form. The FDA found that since the same chemical form of folic acid is added to
both dietary supplements and to fortiﬁed foods, it would be misleading to say that dietary supplements are
more eﬀective than foods. And third, regarding the physiological eﬀectiveness of folic acid versus natural
food folate, the FDA noted that although folic acid may have a higher bioavailability, the two are both used
by the body and oﬀer the same protective eﬀects. Thus, the FDA concluded that the scientiﬁc data did not
support the claim. The FDA also considered the claim to be inherently misleading and incurable through
the use of a disclaimer.
The Pearson Plaintiﬀs responded to the FDA’s letter decision by ﬁling another lawsuit on November 13,
2000.138 In the suit they sought a “preliminary injunction enjoining the FDA from taking any action
which would prevent Plaintiﬀs from using their desired folic acid health claim.”139 The Pearson Plaintiﬀs
again used the First Amendment as the basis for their suit, claiming that the FDA “fundamentally misread
and misapplied” the Court of Appeals’ decision, to which the FDA responded that the 0.8 claim was not
protected speech because it was “inherently misleading” and incurable through a disclaimer.140 Although
the case was again before Judge Gladys Kessler, the district court judge who had ruled in favor of the
FDA in the previous lawsuit, the Judge this time had harsh words for the FDA. She wrote that “the FDA
simply failed to comply with the constitutional guidelines outlined in Pearson. Indeed, the agency appears
to have at best, misunderstood, and at worst, deliberately ignored, highly relevant portions of the Court of
Appeals Opinion.”141 She noted that the Court of Appeals had “strongly suggested” that the 0.8 claim was
potentially, not inherently, misleading, and was probably curable with a disclaimer.
138130 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2001).
139Id. at 107.
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61After examining the FDA’s reasoning in its letter opinion, the court found the FDA’s determination that
the claim was inherently misleading and unable to be cured with disclaimers to be arbitrary and capricious.
She therefore found the FDA to be in violation of the Court of Appeals’ decision, and remanded the case
to the FDA with instructions ordering it to “draft one or more appropriately short, succinct, and accurate
disclaimers.”142 The FDA responded with a letter dated April 3, 2001, in which it approved the use of
the claim if accompanied by the disclaimer “FDA does not endorse this claim. Public health authorities
recommend that women consume 0.4 mg folic acid daily from fortiﬁed foods or dietary supplements or both
to reduce the risk of neural tube defects.” This, the FDA claimed, was preferable to the disclaimers proposed
by the courts in that it fully explains why the FDA found the claim misleading and inaccurate. The FDA
wrote that it would exercise its enforcement discretion regarding supplements bearing the 0.8 claim so long
as the disclaimer “is placed immediately adjacent to and directly beneath [it], with no intervening material,
in the same size, typeface, and contrast as the claim itself.” The letter also noted, however, that the FDA
still believed the 0.8 claim to be misleading and incurable through a disclaimer, so it had ﬁled with the court
a motion for reconsideration.
Judge Kessler denied this motion on May 7, 2001, with more harsh words for the FDA, ﬁnding that it still
had not satisﬁed the “heavy burden” required to suppress the health claim.143 She wrote, “[i]n moving
for reconsideration, Defendants again seem to ignore the thrust of Pearson I,” and “[i]n its motion for
reconsideration, the FDA has again refused to accept the reality and ﬁnality of” the Court of Appeals’
decision ﬁnding the claims not inherently misleading should be treated with disclaimers, not suppression.144
After this rebuke the FDA and the Pearson Plaintiﬀs reached an agreement under which the FDA allowed
the use of the 0.8 claim when accompanied by the FDA’s proposed disclaimer, and the case was ﬁnally
142Id at 120.
143Pearson, et al. v. Thompson, et al. 141 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2001).
144Id. at 112.
62dismissed on June 4, 2001.145
Impact of FDA’s Actions
Although the court battles concerning health claims and dietary supplements continues on today, the FDA’s
three-part action on the folate issue during the mid-1990s has remained largely unchanged since the fortiﬁ-
cation program became mandatory in January of 1998. Therefore, it is possible now to examine early studies
analyzing the potential eﬀects of the program. Although it does not appear that there has been extensive
research in this area, there are studies and data available regarding the rate of neural tube defects both
before and after fortiﬁcation and regarding the levels of folate present in the U.S. population’s blood.
One study, published in the June 20, 2001, issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association, looked
at the occurrence of neural tube defects in the U.S. before and after the fortiﬁcation of the food supply
(“Honein study”).146 The study examined birth certiﬁcates from 45 states during the period from January,
1990, to December, 1999.147 Birth certiﬁcates, since 1989, have included check boxes for certain birth defects,
including both anencephaly and spina biﬁda. Although the authors note that birth certiﬁcate data may not
be of the highest quality, they attempted to control for its abnormalities through statistical techniques. The
authors used data from three times periods to create the comparison. They used births from October, 1998,
through December, 1999, as the post-fortiﬁcation period, since the fortiﬁcation program had been completely
implemented prior to when those pregnancies would have begun. Then, for the two pre-fortiﬁcation periods
they examined data from October, 1995, through December, 1996, and from 1990 through 1996. Addition-
ally, the authors looked at data from all women and also separately at data from women who received no
145It is interesting to note that FDA is still litigating certain other health claims for dietary supplements. Judge Kessler
recently issued decisions regarding claims for antioxidant vitamins and saw palmetto extract.
146Margaret A. Honein, Impact of Folic Acid Fortiﬁcation of the U.S. Food Supply on the Occurrence of Neural Tube Defects,
285 JAMA 2981 (2001).
147The study did not include birth certiﬁcates from New Mexico, New York, and Oklahoma because birth certiﬁcates there
did not include birth defect information for a part of the survey period, and it did not include Connecticut or Maryland because
birth defect status was not stated on more than 25% of birth certiﬁcates for various periods during the study.
63prenatal care until at least the third trimester, since those women would have been unlikely to abort a neural
tube defect-aﬀected fetus because of strict anti-late term abortion laws.
The authors compare the various categories of data in numerous ways, and most yield a decline in neural
tube defects from the earlier periods to the post-fortiﬁcation period. For example, the rate of spina biﬁda
in all births declined 23% from the 1995-96 period to the 1998-99 period, and the rate of anencephaly de-
clined 11% between the same periods. Overall, the total rate of neural tube defects declined 19%, from a
rate of 37.8 to 30.5 cases in every 100,000 live births. The authors observed similar percentage declines in
comparing the data from 1990-96 with the post-fortiﬁcation period, and in the various comparisons of data
from mothers receiving only late or no prenatal care. Comparing quarterly data from 1990 through 1999,
the authors noted fairly constant rates of both spina biﬁda and anencephaly during the pre-fortiﬁcation
period, but found statistically signiﬁcant declines for both during three of the ﬁve post-fortiﬁcation quarters
examined. In analyzing these results, the authors note several weaknesses, mostly related to problems with
birth certiﬁcate reporting of birth defects. The authors make few conclusions about the results, but the
19% decline in neural tube defects after fortiﬁcation, with no similar decline in overall birth defects, does
seem to be evidence that the FDA’s fortiﬁcation program was achieving valuable results. The 19% decline,
though, is smaller than was predicted by many of the studies, leaving readers to speculate whether folate is
less important than predicted, whether the fortiﬁcation program was not adding enough folate to women’s
diets, or some other factor was at play.
Evidence of a decline in the number of neural tube defects is also evident in the data available from the CDC.
According to the CDC, there were 24.88 cases of spina biﬁda per 100,000 live births in 1991, as compared
with 20.7 cases in 2000.148 This decline is more pronounced considering the fact that from 1990 through
1995 the rate rose to 27.98 before declining to the 2000 levels. The decline in cases of anencephaly is less
148Statistics available on-line at www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/pdf/nvsr50 05t49.pdf, www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/hestats/folic/folic.htm.
64pronounced, though, as the rate went from 12.79 in 1992 to 10.7 in 2000 (the rate in 1991 was 18.38 – far
higher than the rate in any of the following years). These declines of 16.8% and 16.3%, respectively, are
somewhat more modest than may have been predicted, but do translate into over 250 less cases of neural
tube defects each year.149
Other studies examined the eﬀects of fortiﬁcation on the level of folate in the blood. One such study was
published in The New England Journal of Medicine on May 13, 1999 (“Jacques study”).150 That study
examined the results of tests performed on the oﬀspring of people who participated in a heart disease study
in Framingham, Massachusetts, conducted during the late 1940s. The oﬀspring were examined several times,
including once in the early 1990s and once in the late 1990s. The authors of the Jacques study determined
that most products subject to fortiﬁcation were fortiﬁed by July, 1997, so they used those participants ex-
amined after that date as the test group, and the data from the early 1990s as the control. Speciﬁcally,
the authors examined the plasma folate and total homocysteine concentrations151 from those participants’
blood work. They found that in participants who did not use supplements, the plasma folate concentra-
tions increased by 117% after fortiﬁcation, while the number of participants with low folate concentrations
decreased by 92%. Also, homocysteine levels decreased by 50% among those who did not use supplements.
Folate levels were higher and homocysteine levels were lower among those who did use supplements. This
data led the authors to conclude that fortiﬁcation has had a substantial eﬀect on these folate indicators.
Although the study participants were largely middle-aged and older adults, the authors note that there is
no reason to believe there are not similar changes in the folate levels of women of child-bearing age.
The ﬁndings of the Jacques study were similar to those of a study published in the September 11, 1999,
149Based on approximately 4,031,591 live births per year (which is the number of live births, excluding New Mexico, reported
by CDC in 2000). See www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/pdf/nvsr50 05t49.pdf.
150Paul F. Jacques, et al., The Eﬀect of Folic Acid Fortiﬁcation on Plasma Folate and Total Homocysteine Concentrations,
340 New Eng. J. Med. 1449 (1999).
151The authors state that homocysteine concentration is a marker for folate status.
65edition of The Lancet (“Lawrence study”).152 The authors of the Lawrence study evaluated data on serum
folate concentrations in samples of blood submitted to Kaiser Permanente in Southern California from 1994
through 1998. The 98,351 samples were from persons of all ages, with half coming from those age 40 to 69
years old, and 53% from women. The authors found that the percentage of participants with high serum
folate levels (deﬁned as greater than or equal to 20 µg/L) increased from 25.6% in 1994 to 45.3% in 1998,
while the percentage with low serum folate levels (less than 2.7 µg/L) decreased from 1.3% to 0.3% during
the same period. Over that period, the medium level increased from 12.6 µg/L to 18.7µg/L. In evaluating
this data, the authors determined that the increase in folate levels was likely due to fortiﬁcation, and that
the results may be similar to those of the population at large. Thus, the Lawrence study and the Jacques
study both found levels of folate in the blood to have increased sharply after the implementation of the folic
acid fortiﬁcation program. There appear to be no studies showing contrary results.
Commentary
In the early part of 2003, we can now step back and review a largely ﬁnished process regarding folic acid.
The link between folic acid and neural tube defects seems to have become solidiﬁed into common medical
knowledge among practitioners, foods and dietary supplements are allowed to carry a health claim regarding
use of the product and the protective beneﬁts of folic acid, and our food supply has been fortiﬁed with
folic acid so that, even if we have never heard of it, we are sure to ingest at least some quantity of it most
days. Aside from a few commentators who think the level of fortiﬁcation is still not high enough, the action
surrounding folic acid has largely died down, and mostly come to an end. So we can now ask three important
questions. First, was the process worth the trouble and expense? Second, did the process go as well as it
should have? And third, what, if any, role should the FDA have had in the process?
152Jean M. Lawrence, et al., Trends in serum folate after food fortiﬁcation, 354 The Lancet 915 (1999).
66Costs versus beneﬁts
Regarding the ﬁrst question, now that the folic acid controversy has wound down, we can attempt to examine
whether the process was actually worthwhile. This is a multi-part inquiry, the ﬁrst part of which calls into
question the number of lives saved. As has been discussed previously, prior to the FDA’s action on folic
acid approximately 2,500 babies each year were born with neural tube defects, and an unknown number
of additional fetuses were aﬀected by neural tube defects but were aborted through planned terminations
after diagnosis or through spontaneous abortions. Because of the deadly or crippling nature of neural tube
defects, having over 2,500 births aﬀected by them is tragic. However, the number is tiny considering the fact
that there are over 4 million births in the United States each year.
So, was all of the work by scientists, the FDA, and others really necessary? Although the number of neural
tube defects is small in comparison to the overall number of births, the struggle becomes much more valuable
when one considers what a high percentage of the cases could be prevented with folic acid. As previously
stated, simply obtaining adequate folic acid, women could prevent anywhere from 40% to 70% of neural tube
defects. This translates into anywhere from 1000 to 1750 less cases each year, and that does not even count
the number of fetuses which would not be aborted as a result of a defect. The fact that such a huge portion
of the defects can be prevented with folic acid certainly helps balance the fact that the actual number of
prevented cases is a small fraction of the total number of births. Does this justify the money and time
devoted to folic acid? Perhaps, but perhaps not. It does, however, at least make it much more justiﬁable.
Beyond just the sheer number of cases of neural tube defects involved from the beginning, asking whether
or not the campaign was worth while also requires looking at the actual results. Here, two pieces of data are
67important: the actual decline in the incidence of neural tube defects and consumer awareness of the necessity
of folic acid in preventing birth defects. Regarding the former, it has already been noted that the incidence
of neural tube defects has declined over the past 10+ years. Studies of most states have shown declines
in spina biﬁda and anencephaly prevalence of 25% and 21%, respectively, from 1996 to 2001, although the
1999-2001 rates were fairly constant.153 Taking into account data going back even further, the total rates
for both disorders appear to be down over 30% from the early 1990s.154 These numbers do show signiﬁcant
progress, but certainly not the progress which was predicted during the early days of the campaign. Does
this mean the campaign was not worth while, since only 500 to 750 cases were probably prevented? Probably
not. Indeed, it was especially worthwhile to the 500 to 750 children who are healthy today but may have
otherwise been born with a neural tube defect. It may, however, indicate that the FDA’s conservative levels
of fortiﬁcation may need to be increased before the population receives the maximum protective eﬀects of
folic acid.
The numbers, though, only tell a part of the story. The folic acid campaign had two prongs: fortiﬁcation and
health claims. The issue originally arose out of Congress’s demand that the FDA consider a health claim
regarding the relationship between neural tube defects and folic acid, and the fortiﬁcation issue arose along
the way. So, originally, the issue arose as part of Congress’s desire to see consumers receive more information
regarding the health eﬀects of foods. This approach seems to be a more person-centered approach, as it
requires women to take responsibility for their own nutrition and ensure they receive adequate folic acid at
all times. The FDA eventually also pursued the more passive method of fortiﬁcation as it probably, wisely,
knew that many women would not take responsibility for increasing their folic acid intake, so some sort of
passive delivery method was necessary. This two-pronged approach should, in theory, provide women with
information regarding which products contain high levels of folic acid, and why that is important, as well as
153T.J. Mathews, et al., Spina Biﬁda and Anencephaly Prevalence – United States, 1991-2001, 51 MMWR 9, (Sept. 13, 2002).
154Id.
68providing them, passively, with folic acid in case they do not actively seek it.
However, the results on the consumer awareness front are, at best, disappointing. Just a quick survey of
grocery store shelves is all that is necessary to show that producers have not embraced the FDA’s blessing
of a folic acid health message. Few products, if any, bear any type of folic acid claim. Also, few women
seem to know about folic acid or its helpful beneﬁts. The 1998 March of Dimes and Gallup Organization
phone survey of over 2000 women age 18-45, mentioned previously, revealed that while 32% of women were
taking a multivitamin daily and 68% of women had heard of folic acid, only 13% knew it helped prevent
birth defects, and only 7% knew it needed to be taken before pregnancy.155 Although the response rate
was low (51%), and the numbers did show an increase from the levels of awareness in 1995, they show that
even after the FDA had allowed health claims to appear on products and required fortiﬁcation, the vast
majority of women still had no idea why folic acid is important and how it needs to be used. This is even
more surprising considering that the folic acid campaign was covered by all major newspapers, including the
New York Times and the Washington Post, and the health beneﬁts of folic acid have been written about
repeatedly in both newspapers.
What, if anything, does this evidence show? While it may indicate a lack of responsibility on the part of
American women or a failure of the FDA’s attempts to educate the public through health claims on product
labels, it perhaps shows that the FDA was correct in proposing, along with the health claim authorization,
the fortiﬁcation program now in place. The FDA’s error on this front was that it far overestimated the
number of women who would seek out folic acid, thus causing it to overestimate the amount of folic acid
women would receive. This evidence also shows that, in hindsight, the FDA spent too much time pondering
the health claim issue. In its defense, the FDA seems to have sincerely thought companies would race to
155CDC, Knowledge and Use of Folic Acid by Women of Childbearing Age – United States, 1995-1998, 48 MMWR 325 (April
30, 1999).
69place a folic acid health claim on their products, thus ﬂooding the market with these health claims, causing
consumers to buy up folate-rich foods in large quantities. This is all evidenced from its continual hand-
wringing in the Federal Register during the mid-1990s. However, the health claims it proposed seem too
long and clumsy to be workably included in most food packaging. Although the FDA realized that and
authorized much shorter claims than it originally proposed, the authorized claims were still probably too
wordy and “boring” to appeal to manufacturers. As a result, few foods carry a folic acid claim, and few
consumers know what folic acid is. So, baring some sort of intensive informational campaign, the fortiﬁcation
program seems to be the main vehicle of folic acid intake for most women. Thus, in hindsight, the FDA could
have devoted more time to rapidly instituting the fortiﬁcation program, and potentially authorizing higher
levels of fortiﬁcation, and, as will be discussed below, spent less time debating the merits of the various
health claims.
Evaluating the process
Returning now to the second of the originally-posed questions, it is necessary to examine whether the process
the FDA actually undertook was as well-run as possible. One thing is exceedingly clear – the FDA moves
very slowly. It took no action on folic acid, despite the mounting evidence of its health beneﬁts, until the
issue was thrust into its lap in the NLEA. Then, it took three years before it even issued proposed regulations.
Another three years passed before the ﬁnal regulations were issued, and two more years before fortiﬁcation
became mandatory. Thus, the entire process took nearly eight years, from start to ﬁnish. To be fair, the
FDA needs to be cautious with any process of this nature. Allowing health claims which later turn out to be
incorrect or dangerous, or requiring fortiﬁcation with a nutrient which could later prove fatal, would be, at
best, damaging, and at worst, deadly, to the FDA’s credibility and trustworthiness. As Dr. David Kessler,
Commissioner of the FDA during the folic acid period, explained in a New York Times article, “a decision
70to add a pharmacologically active nutrient to the food supply is very weighty. You have to get it right, and
you have to get it right the ﬁrst time. There is no simple answer and no simple solution is readily apparent.
We want to make major inroads on this disease, but we don’t want to harm anyone.”156 The FDA is rightly
justiﬁed in moving slowly. However, eight years is an exceedingly long time for a process such as this. In
the interim, preventable cases of neural tube defects killed or paralyzed hundreds of children who might
otherwise have been healthy.
In arguing in favor of reform of the FDA in advance of the 1997 FDA Modernization Act (“1997 Act”),
Senators Barbara Mikulski and Nancy Kassembaum stated, “Rarely, however, is a word spoken about the
cases of spina biﬁda that could have been averted had the FDA not delayed for years in permitting health
claims to be made about the beneﬁts of folic acid in preventing such neural tube disorders.”157 The slow
speed at which the FDA moved, even if reasonable in most cases, becomes somewhat less so considering
that the only harmful eﬀect even mentioned of large quantities of folic acid was a potential rare masking
of a vitamin B12 deﬁciency in elderly people. Thus, the FDA was forced to balance the potential beneﬁcial
eﬀects of folic acid for a small percentage of babies with the potential harmful eﬀects for a small percentage
of the elderly – not an easy tradeoﬀ. Were this folic acid process to occur today, it may not have taken quite
the same amount of time and energy, at least on the health claims issue, because Congress, through the 1997
Act, made it easier for manufacturers to bypass the FDA in placing health claims on their products. The
Act allows manufacturers to place a health claim on their food products, unless the FDA has banned such a
claim through regulations, if the manufacturer gives the FDA 120 days notice and the following requirement
is met:
156Marian Burros, Eating Well, N.Y. Times, Jan 5 1994, at C4.
157Barbara Mikulski & Nancy Kassebaum, The FDA Can Work Better, Wash. Post, July 26, 1996, at A27.
71[A] scientiﬁc body of the United States Government with oﬃcial responsibility for public health
protection or research directly relating to human nutrition (such as the National Institutes of Health
or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) or the National Academy of Sciences or any
of its subdivisions has published an authoritative statement, which is currently in eﬀect, about the
relationship between a nutrient and a disease or health-related condition to which the claim refers.158
This change therefore may avert the lengthy delay which occurred with the folic acid health claims. Since
the CDC, though the PHS, issued its folic acid recommendation in 1992, had this change been in eﬀect then,
it would presumably have allowed manufacturers to make folic acid claims without FDA approval.
The proper role for the FDA
Finally, it is now possible to review the FDA’s role in the folic acid process to critically examine whether
the current system is appropriate, or whether the FDA might better play a more active or passive role
during similar undertakings in the future. As has been mentioned, the FDA’s role in the folic acid process
was centered around the fortiﬁcation and food additives issue and around the health claims issue. As has
been discussed, the FDA moved slowly in dealing with each of these issues, but did act on both fronts.
Its actions regarding the fortiﬁcation and food additives portion of the folic acid process, although slow,
seem to be actions which are appropriately within the FDA’s jurisdiction, especially since they led to a
successfully-implemented fortiﬁcation system. However, the FDA’s actions regarding health claims seem
more problematic. Although the resulting folic acid health claims regulations were a product of the same
process as fortiﬁcation, they led to a major lawsuit and have not produced a situation where folic acid health
claims are widely used.
There are numerous problems with the current FDA approach to health claims regulations. First, the regu-
lations often require health claims to be prohibitively long and complicated. As the folic acid example shows,
the FDA seems concerned with providing consumers with full, non-misleading health claims. In attempting
to achieve this goal, the FDA takes a paternalistic approach by requiring manufacturers to provide large
amounts of information so as to prevent all possible misinterpretations. This paternalism results in regula-
72tions requiring the health claims to be so long that they likely become unattractive to manufacturers and
too long to quickly catch a consumer’s eye.
A second problem with the health claims requirements is that they often prevent manufacturers from making
true statements about their products. Because of the many elements required by the regulations to appear
in a health claim, a manufacturer desiring to use a shorter, but still entirely true, health claim would be
unable to do so. The problem was even more relevant prior to the passage of the 1997 Act, which allows
manufacturers to bypass the FDA if certain other governmental bodies have made nutrient-disease relation-
ship statements. As Noah and Noah note in their pre-1997 Act article, manufacturers would then have been
barred from placing the following claim on product labels: “The U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
have encouraged all women of childbearing age to consume 0.4 milligrams of folic acid each day to reduce
their risk of having a pregnancy which results in a neural tube birth defect such as spina biﬁda.”159 Even
after the passage of the 1997 Act, manufacturers may still be prevented from making a true statement such
as this, even though it is accurately based on the PHS recommendation, because the FDA has required that
certain additional elements must appear in folic acid health claims.
A third problem with the FDA’s health claim authorization process is that manufacturers can circumvent
the regulations. In her article discussing numerous ways manufacturers avoid the FDA’s health claims
regulations, Heller notes that the largest loophole in the regulations is that while health claims must be
pre-approved by the FDA, structure/function claims need no such pre-approval.160 Manufacturers have,
therefore, made use of statements they claim to be structure/function claims, even though the same state-
ments would be barred if classiﬁed as health claims. A structure/function claim “describes the role of a
nutrient or dietary ingredient intended to aﬀect the structure or function in humans, [and] characterizes
the documented mechanism by which a nutrient or dietary ingredient acts to maintain such structure or
159Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labeling Controls and the First Amendment, 47
Fla. L. Rev. 63, 68 (1995).
160Irene Ringel Heller, Functional Foods: Regulatory and Marketing Developments, 56 Food and Drug L.J. 197, 199 (2001).
73function...”161 whereas a health claim “characterizes the relationship of any nutrient to a disease or health
related-condition.”162 The line between these two types of claims is ﬁne, but as Heller reports, after the
FDA denied authorization of a health claim relating folic acid, vitamin B6, and vitamin B12 to a reduced risk
of heart disease, the Kellogg Company began placing the claim “adequate intakes of folic acid, vitamin B6,
and B12 may promote a healthy vascular system” on certain of its products, calling it a structure/function
claim.163 Similarly, although the Campbell Soup Company’s V8 vegetable juice contains too much sodium
to qualify for an FDA-approved health claim, Heller notes that Campbell placed the statement “Research...
suggests that antioxidants [in V8 juice] may play an important role in slowing changes that occur with
normal aging” on V8, justifying the move by calling the statement a structure/function claim.164 Both the
Kellogg and Campbell claims seem very much like the health claims the FDA regulates, and both claims are
speciﬁcally barred from product labels if they are classiﬁed as health claims. Both, however, were used by
manufacturers under the guise of structure/function claims. If manufacturers are allowed to use such claims
on their products without the FDA’s approval, it seems almost pointless for any manufacturer to bother
following the FDA’s cumbersome health claims restrictions.
Thus these problems, and certainly there are others, paint the FDA’s health claims regulatory scheme as
cumbersome, restrictive, and easy to circumvent. What, then, are the potential options for improvement?
One option would be to remove regulation of health claims from the FDA’s jurisdiction and create an unreg-
ulated, market-driven environment. Manufacturers in an unregulated environment would then be allowed to
place claims on their products as they see ﬁt. Under this type of system, keeping labels accurate and truthful
would be left to the market, and it would likely force consumers to take a more active role in learning about
nutrition in order to determine which claims are accurate and which are less accurate or even misleading.
16121 U.S.C. § 403(r)(6)(A).
16221 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1)(B).
163Heller, supra note 160, at 209.
164Heller, supra note 160, at 210.
74Because the basic nutrition labeling panel would still appear on food products, consumers would need to take
a more proactive role in examining the panel to ensure they select foods which form a complete, healthy diet.
This system is fairly risky, however, because as the FDA found when it loosened its health claim standards
prior to the enactment of the NLEA, manufacturers in an unregulated environment are willing to stretch
the limits of truthfulness.165 Because, as has been discussed, consumers may be unwilling or unable to take
a more active role in seeking out information about nutrition, they may be unable to discern truthful from
misleading health claims.
More likely, if regulation of health claims is removed from the FDA’s jurisdiction it would move into the
Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) jurisdiction. Through the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,166 the
FTC already regulates the labeling of all consumer commodities (except those under the FDA’s jurisdiction)
to ensure proper disclosure and prevent deception of consumers. Because the FTC already has experience
in regulating product labels, it might be better equipped to deal with the issue of health claims. In fact,
the FTC submits comments on FDA proposals regarding health claims, as it did recently in the matter of
labeling requirement for trans fatty acids.167 Additionally, the “FTC considers the prevention of deceptive
health-related advertising claims to be one of its highest priorities, and has taken action in numerous cases
involving deceptive health-related claims about food products and dietary supplements.”168 Thus, there is
clearly overlap between the two agencies’ jurisdictions, so it seems possible that the FTC, with its broad
experience in consumer products labeling, might be better equipped to regulate the health claims area.
A third alternative approach would involve combining the two agencies’ expertise so as to make the health
165See supra note 57.
16615 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461.
167Staﬀ of the Bureau of Economics, the Bureau of Consumer Protection, and the Oﬃce of Policy Planning of the Federal
Trade Commission, In the Matter of Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims and
Health Claims, December 16, 2002. Available on-line at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v030003.htm#N 4 .
168Id.
75claims regulatory scheme work more eﬃciently. Such a move might actually be underway at the time of this
writing. On December 18, 2003, the FTC, citing the fact that the current system has led to a number of false
health claims on dietary supplements and a decreased number of total health claims on conventional foods,
announced that it would be coordinating with the FDA on a new consumer health information initiative to
eliminate false health claims while making it easier for manufacturers to use health claims in labeling.169
Although it is too early to determine exactly how this new initiative will operate, if it works as described,
by both eliminating false claims and making health claims easier to use, perhaps it will be a solution to the
ﬂaws in the current regulatory scheme.
Finally, although it appears that the FDA is moving to change the current health claims regulation system,
there are certain positive aspects of the current system which provide support for its retention. Despite
being cumbersome, overly restrictive, and easy to circumvent, the current system protects consumers from
certain misleading information. The FDA must strike a balance between providing consumers with enough
information for them to make informed choices and keeping required information limited enough so as not
to overwhelm consumers or prevent manufacturers from providing any information. Just as the FDA moved
slowly and cautiously on the entire folic acid regulatory package in order to ensure it made no mistakes,
the FDA’s cumbersome, restrictive system for approving health claims potentially keeps a large portion of
false or misleading information away from consumers. Closing the structure/function loophole would further
reduce the ﬂow of misleading information, which seems to be the only dangerous aspect of the current system.
As noted, each of these potential courses for handling future regulation of the health claims area has both
positive and negative aspects. Although deregulating health claims and allowing market forces to govern
is the simplest approach, manufacturer abuse of health claims during the regulatory thaw preceding the
NLEA’s passage likely eliminated any possibility of this course being taken. Maintaining the current system
169FTC, FTC and FDA Coordinate for New Consumer Health Information Initiative, December 18, 2002. Available on-line
at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/ftcfda.htm.
76is also unlikely because the FDA has shown that, while very diligent in its pursuit of safe and eﬀective
health claims, it is simply not able to eﬃciently control this area. Because it is too small, too inexperienced
in this area, or simply too cautious, if the FDA continues to control the regulation of health claims it is
unlikely that consumers will soon see health claims in the quantity necessary for the claims to be of true
assistance. It might therefore be prudent to attempt to pursue either a joint system of control between the
FDA and the FTC, or to have the FTC take total control of health claims. While evaluating the FTC’s
ability to do the monitoring and regulatory work eﬀectively is outside the scope of this paper, it seems at
ﬁrst blush that the FTC’s vast experience in monitoring labeling of all non-food and drug projects might
make it better able to create an eﬃcient regulatory system. So, while the proper course of future action is
perhaps unclear, it is apparent that the FDA’s current cumbersome, circumventable system is in need of a
change before properly-monitored health claims can eﬀectively inform and educate the consuming public.
Hopefully the current cooperative eﬀort between the FDA and the FTC will create the changes necessary
for a more eﬀective regulatory system.
Conclusion
Thus today, 13 years after the passage of the NLEA, the folic acid controversy seems to have passed.
Manufacturers can use folic acid health claims on their products, and enriched foods now include one more
nutrient. More people know about folic acid and its beneﬁts, although those understanding its beneﬁts are
still woefully in the minority. Folate levels in the blood are up, and the prevalence of neural tube defects
is down. So, where should we go from here? It seems obvious from the evidence presented that progress
has been made, but more is certainly possible. Two solutions seem to exist: more fortiﬁcation and more
education. The ﬁrst is the passive track, simply adding more folic acid to fortiﬁed foods. Many researchers
have pushed for higher levels of fortiﬁcation, and the FDA did consider it during the mid-1990s. However,
77with increased fortiﬁcation comes increased risks. Folic acid has recently been shown to have potential
beneﬁts in other health areas, such as the prevention of cardiovascular disease and Alzheimer’s disease, so
increased fortiﬁcation may be an option.170 However, the risks which concerned the FDA originally seem
still to be present.
On the other hand, we might also try an increased level of consumer education. It seems somewhat ludicrous
that in order to get American women of childbearing age to consume adequate folic acid, the government
has to fortify the food supply, thus aﬀecting the entire population. An education plan would place more
responsibility on individual women to be sure they eat a healthy diet and perhaps take a vitamin supplement.
It is a sad day when the government needs to force people to do something beneﬁcial for their health, as
otherwise they would not do it. Nonetheless, such a plan has had success in South Carolina, for example,
where the state spends $1 million per year on a folic acid informational campaign including billboards,
television commercials, and informational materials and programs at bridal registries, colleges, and health
care providers.171 From 1992 to 1998 South Carolina’s rate of neural tube defects, originally twice the
national average, was cut in half. Nationally, therefore, an informative campaign may be helpful in increasing
awareness. Perhaps the newly announced partnership between the FDA and the FTC in the area of health
claims will produce an environment more conducive to the use of health claims by manufacturers, thereby
increasing the use of product labeling in as part of what could be a broader educational campaign.
Whatever the future may hold, it is evident from the foregoing that the process involved to reach the present
situation regarding folic acid has been long and complicated. However, it has also been safe. Perhaps in this
situation the FDA could have moved more quickly, but hindsight is 20/20. Although, sadly, many children
may have been born with neural tube defects as a result of the slow speed of the process, this must be
170Marian Burros, Eating Well; One More Reason to Eat Your Greens, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2001, at F5.
171Eric Nagourney, Campaign Touts the Beneﬁts of Folic Acid, N.Y. Times, Dec 12, 2000, at F8.
78balanced with the unknown risks which worried the FDA every step of the way. As with any such process,
although there are certain things which probably should have been done diﬀerently, there were also valuable
lessons learned and, perhaps most importantly, things are better as a result of it. As more evidence is
released, changes will probably need to be made in the current rules and regulations, but hopefully those,
too, will continue to make the food supply safer and healthier.
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